Mobile phone use has become a standard aspect of daily life for many Americans in the last decade. The increased use of these devices coupled with the evolution of technologies that enable consumers to conduct financial transactions using their mobile phones has the potential to change how consumers manage their finances as new services and tools emerge. In addition, innovative financial service technologies may help foster financial access and inclusion in the mainstream financial system for underserved consumers-those who are unbanked or underbanked. For these reasons, the Federal Reserve Board has been monitoring trends and developments in mobile financial services such as mobile banking and payments. In late December 2011 and early January 2012, the Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs (DCCA) conducted a survey in order to better understand consumers' use of and opinions about mobile financial services. 1 Key FindingsUsing data from the Board's Survey of Consumers and Mobile Financial Services (SCMFS), this article provides a description of unbanked and underbanked consumers, and examines their use of financial products and services (see Appendix A: Survey Data Collection). The article further explores how unbanked and underbanked consumers are making use of emerging mobile financial services technologies. The potential for mobile banking and mobile payments to expand access and inclusion to the mainstream financial system is also examined. Several key findings from the survey stand out: ‰ Approximately 11 percent of U.S. consumers are unbanked, and another 11 percent are underbanked.Note: We gratefully acknowledge the help of Federal Reserve System staff who served on the advisory team for this project:

We examine the evolution of mortgage modification terms obtained by distressed subprime borrowers during the recent housing crisis, and the effect of the various types of modifications on the subsequent loan performance. Using the CoreLogic LoanPerformance dataset that contains detailed loan level information on mortgages, modification terms, second liens, and home values, we estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model with competing risks to examine the determinants of post-modification mortgage outcomes. We find that principal reductions are particularly effective at improving loan outcomes, as high loan-to-value ratios are the single greatest contributor to re-default and foreclosure. However, any modification that reduces total payment and interest (P&I) reduces the likelihood of subsequent re-default and foreclosure. Modifications that involve increasing the loan principal-primarily through capitalized interest and fees-are more likely to fail, even controlling for changes in P&I.

We examine the evolution of mortgage modification terms obtained by distressed subprime borrowers during the recent housing crisis, and the effect of the various types of modifications on the subsequent loan performance. Using the CoreLogic LoanPerformance dataset that contains detailed loan level information on mortgages, modification terms, second liens, and home values, we estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model with competing risks to examine the determinants of post-modification mortgage outcomes. We find that principal reductions are particularly effective at improving loan outcomes, as high loan-to-value ratios are the single greatest contributor to re-default and foreclosure. However, any modification that reduces total payment and interest (P&I) reduces the likelihood of subsequent re-default and foreclosure. Modifications that involve increasing the loan principal-primarily through capitalized interest and fees-are more likely to fail, even controlling for changes in P&I.

We examine the evolution of mortgage modification terms obtained by distressed subprime borrowers during the recent housing crisis, and the effect of the various types of modifications on the subsequent loan performance. Using the CoreLogic LoanPerformance dataset that contains detailed loan level information on mortgages, modification terms, second liens, and home values, we estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model with competing risks to examine the determinants of post-modification mortgage outcomes. We find that principal reductions are particularly effective at improving loan outcomes, as high loan-to-value ratios are the single greatest contributor to re-default and foreclosure. However, any modification that reduces total payment and interest (P&I) reduces the likelihood of subsequent re-default and foreclosure. Modifications that involve increasing the loan principal-primarily through capitalized interest and fees-are more likely to fail, even controlling for changes in P&I.

We examine the evolution of mortgage modification terms obtained by distressed subprime borrowers during the recent housing crisis, and the effect of the various types of modifications on the subsequent loan performance. Using the CoreLogic LoanPerformance dataset that contains detailed loan level information on mortgages, modification terms, second liens, and home values, we estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model with competing risks to examine the determinants of post-modification mortgage outcomes. We find that principal reductions are particularly effective at improving loan outcomes, as high loan-to-value ratios are the single greatest contributor to re-default and foreclosure. However, any modification that reduces total payment and interest (P&I) reduces the likelihood of subsequent re-default and foreclosure. Modifications that involve increasing the loan principal-primarily through capitalized interest and fees-are more likely to fail, even controlling for changes in P&I.