Probation officers (POs) operate in a high-risk environment. They are vulnerable to mediatic and political backlash and are confronted with managerial innovations that can conflict with their values. A thematic analysis of 29 interviews with Belgian POs reveals that classical coping mechanisms caused by time shortages, such as rationing and prioritization, are amplified by managerialism. POs also break rules which present limited meaningfulness and routinize offender control to alleviate pressure from accountabilities to both managers and the general public. The study demonstrates that managerialism and accountabilities to the managers, the public, and the politicians model coping mechanisms in high-risk environments.

Street-level bureaucrats play a key role in the delivery of public services to the citizens with whom they interact. Using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analyses approach, we rely on a street-level perspective to report a systematic review of 46 studies about officer-offender interactions in prisons and probation services. In doing so, we examine how correctional officers articulate state-agencywhereby they focus on the implementation of rules and policiesand citizen-agency

The use of artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making in public policy processes is influenced by a range of diverse drivers. This article provides a comprehensive view of 13 drivers and their interrelationships, identified through empirical findings from the taxation and social security domains in Belgium. These drivers are organized into five hierarchical layers that policy designers need to focus on when introducing advanced analytics in fraud detection: (a) trust layer, (b) interoperability layer, (c) perceived benefits layer, (d) data governance layer, and (e) digital governance layer. The layered approach enables a holistic view of assessing adoption challenges concerning new digital technologies. The research uses thematic analysis and interpretive structural modeling.

Au sein des Maisons de justice, des assistants de justice (AJ) sont chargés de la guidance des justiciables condamnés à une mesure probatoire. Ce travail est assorti de mesures de contrôle et d’assistance. Or, la tension qui accompagne ces deux missions est accrue par la hausse des exigences administratives et une importante scrutation médiatique en cas de récidive. Cette contribution explore la marge de manœuvre dont disposent les AJ dans l’exercice de leur fonction. Une analyse thématique conduite auprès de 29 AJ francophones révèle que – malgré un nombre croissant de dossiers, un temps limité pour les traiter et un contrôle managérial grandissant – les AJ ne donnent pas nécessairement la priorité aux profils les plus commodes. Au contraire, ils agissent prioritairement auprès des justiciables les plus problématiques. Cette bienveillance discrétionnaire est discutée au regard de la street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 2010). Elle s’explique autant par un ethos professionnel résistant aux injonctions néomanagériales que par un certain désir de préservation personnelle.