Despite recent excitement generated by the peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm and the surprisingly rapid deployment of some P2P applications, there are few quantitative evaluations of P2P systems behavior. The open architecture, achieved scale, and self-organizing structure of the Gnutella network make it an interesting P2P architecture to study. Like most other P2P applications, Gnutella builds, at the application level, a virtual network with its own routing mechanisms. The topology of this virtual network and the routing mechanisms used have a significant influence on application properties such as performance, reliability, and scalability. We have built a "crawler" to extract the topology of Gnutella's application level network. In this paper we analyze the topology graph and evaluate generated network traffic. Our two major findings are that: (1) although Gnutella is not a pure power-law network, its current configuration has the benefits and drawbacks of a power-law structure, and (2) the Gnutella virtual network topology does not match well the underlying Internet topology, hence leading to ineffective use of the physical networking infrastructure. These findings guide us to propose changes to the Gnutella protocol and implementations that may bring significant performance and scalability improvements. We believe that our findings as well as our measurement and analysis techniques have broad applicability to P2P systems and provide unique insights into P2P system design tradeoffs.

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In wide area computing systems, it is often desirable to create remote read-only copies (replicas) of files. Replication can be used to reduce access latency, improve data locality, and/or increase robustness, scalability and performance for distributed applications. We define a replica location service (RLS) as a system that maintains and provides access to information about the physical locations of copies. An RLS typically functions as one component of a data grid architecture. This paper makes the following contributions. First, we characterize RLS requirements. Next, we describe a parameterized architectural framework, which we name Giggle (for GIGa-scale Global Location Engine), within which a wide range of RLSs can be defined. We define several concrete instantiations of this framework with different performance characteristics. Finally, we present initial performance results for an RLS prototype, demonstrating that RLS systems can be constructed that meet performance goals.

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Web caches, content distribution networks, peer-to-peer file sharing networks, distributed file systems, and data grids all have in common that they involve a community of users who generate requests for shared data. In each case, overall system performance can be improved significantly if we can first identify and then exploit interesting structure within a community's access patterns. To this end, we propose a novel perspective on file sharing based on the study of the relationships that form among users based on the files in which they are interested. We propose a new structure that captures common user interests in data-the data-sharing graph-and justify its utility with studies on three data-distribution systems: a high-energy physics collaboration, the Web, and the Kazaa peer-to-peer network. We find small-world patterns in the data-sharing graphs of all three communities. We analyze these graphs and propose some probable causes for these emergent small-world patterns. The significance of smallworld patterns is twofold: it provides a rigorous support to intuition and, perhaps most importantly, it suggests ways to design mechanisms that exploit these naturally emerging patterns.

Abstract-Detecting fake accounts in online social networks (OSNs) protects OSN operators and their users from various malicious activities. Most detection mechanisms attempt to predict and classify user accounts as real (i.e., benign, honest) or fake (i.e., malicious, Sybil) by analyzing user-level activities or graph-level structures. These mechanisms, however, are not robust against adversarial attacks in which fake accounts cloak their operation with patterns resembling real user behavior.We herein demonstrate that victims, benign users who control real accounts and have befriended fakes, form a distinct classification category that is useful for designing robust detection mechanisms. First, as attackers have no control over victim accounts and cannot alter their activities, a victim account classifier which relies on user-level activities is relatively harder to circumvent. Second, as fakes are directly connected to victims, a fake account detection mechanism that integrates victim prediction into graphlevel structures is more robust against manipulations of the graph.To validate this new approach, we designed Íntegro, a scalable defense system that helps OSNs detect fake accounts using a meaningful a user ranking scheme. Íntegro starts by predicting victim accounts from user-level activities. After that, it integrates these predictions into the graph as weights, so that edges incident to predicted victims have much lower weights than others. Finally, Íntegro ranks user accounts based on a modified random walk that starts from a known real account. Íntegro guarantees that most real accounts rank higher than fakes so that OSN operators can take actions against low-ranking fake accounts.We implemented Íntegro using widely-used, open-source distributed computing platforms in which it scaled nearly linearly. We evaluated Íntegro against SybilRank, the state-of-the-art in fake account detection, using real-world datasets and a largescale deployment at Tuenti, the largest OSN in Spain. We show that Íntegro significantly outperforms SybilRank in user ranking quality, where the only requirement is to employ a victim classifier is better than random. Moreover, the deployment of Íntegro at Tuenti resulted in up to an order of magnitude higher precision in fake accounts detection, as compared to SybilRank.

Online Social Networks (OSNs) have attracted millions of active users and have become an integral part of today's Web ecosystem. Unfortunately, in the wrong hands, OSNs can be used to harvest private user data, distribute malware, control botnets, perform surveillance, spread misinformation, and even influence algorithmic trading. Usually, an adversary starts off by running an infiltration campaign using hijacked or adversary-owned OSN accounts, with an objective to connect with a large number of users in the targeted OSN. In this article, we evaluate how vulnerable OSNs are to a large-scale infiltration campaign run by socialbots: bots that control OSN accounts and mimic the actions of real users. We adopted the design of a traditional web-based botnet and built a prototype of a Socialbot Network (SbN): a group of coordinated programmable socialbots. We operated our prototype on Facebook for eight weeks, and collected data about user behavior in response to a large-scale infiltration campaign. Our results show that (1) by exploiting known social behaviors of users, OSNs such as Facebook can be infiltrated with a success rate of up to 80%, (2) subject to user profile privacy settings, a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches where even more private user data are exposed, (3) given the economics of today's underground markets, running a large-scale infiltration campaign might be profitable but is still not particularly attractive as a sustainable and independent business, (4) the security of socially-aware systems that use or integrate OSN platforms can be at risk, given the infiltration capability of an adversary in OSNs, and (5) defending against malicious socialbots raises a set of challenges that relate to web automation, online-offline identity binding, and usable security.