In a rapidly changing environment, national institutions in charge of health security can no longer rely only on traditional disease reporting mechanisms that are not designed to recognise emergence of new hazards. Epidemic intelligence provides a conceptual framework within which countries may adapt their public health surveillance system to meet new challenges. Epidemic intelligence (EI) encompasses all activities related to early identification of potential health hazards, their verification, assessment and investigation in order to recommend public health control measures. EI integrates both an indicator-based and an event-based component. ‘Indicator-based component’ refers to structured data collected through routine surveillance systems. ‘Event-based component’ refers to unstructured data gathered from sources of intelligence of any nature. All EU member states have long-established disease surveillance systems that provide proper indicator-based surveillance. For most countries, the challenge lies now in developing and structuring the event-based component of EI within national institution in charge of public health surveillance. In May 2006, the European Union member states committed to comply with provisions of the revised International Health Regulations (IHR(2005)) considered relevant to the risk posed by avian and potential human pandemic influenza. This provides for the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) with an opportunity to guide member states in developing and/or strengthening their national EI , in addition to the ECDC’s task of developing an EI system for the EU.

Epidemic diphtheria reemerged in the Russian Federation in 1990 and spread to all Newly Independent States (NIS) and Baltic States by the end of 1994. Factors contributing to the epidemic included increased susceptibility of both children and adults, socioeconomic instability, population movement, deteriorating health infrastructure, initial shortages of vaccine, and delays in implementing control measures. In 1995, aggressive control strategies were implemented, and since then, all affected countries have reported decreases of diphtheria; however, continued efforts by national health authorities and international assistance are still needed. The legacy of this epidemic includes a reexamination of the global diphtheria control strategy, new laboratory techniques for diphtheria diagnosis and analysis, and a model for future public health emergencies in the successful collaboration of multiple international partners. The reemergence of diphtheria warns of an immediate threat of other epidemics in the NIS and Baltic States and a longer-term potential for the reemergence of vaccine-preventable diseases elsewhere. Continued investment in improved vaccines, control strategies, training, and laboratory techniques is needed.

Background: Infectious disease outbreaks require decision makers to make rapid decisions under time pressure and situations of scientific uncertainty, and yet the role of evidence usage in these contexts is poorly understood.<br />Aims and objectives: To define and contextualise the role of scientific evidence in the governance of infectious disease outbreaks and to identify recommendations for overcoming common barriers to evidence-informed decision making.<br />Methods: A scoping review and an expert workshop to provide additional input into recommendations on enhancing evidence uptake during infectious disease outbreaks taking place in European settings.<br />Findings: Forty-nine records reporting on multiple decision-making processes during infectious disease outbreaks of the past ten years were included in the study. Decision makers prioritise expert advice, epidemiological data and mathematical modelling data for risk characterisation and management, but tend to be challenged by scientific uncertainties, which allow for conflicting interpretations of evidence and for public criticism and contestation of decision-making processes. There are concrete opportunities for optimising evidence usage to improve public health policy and practice through investment in decision-making competencies, relationship building, and promoting transparent decision-making processes.<br />Discussion: It is not necessarily a disregard of evidence that puts a strain on decision making in health crises, but rather competing interests and the lack of clear, unambiguous and rapidly available evidence for risk characterisation and effectiveness of response measures.<br />Conclusion: The relationship between science and public health decision making is relatively understudied but is deserving of greater attention, so as to ensure that the pursuit of evidence for decision making does not challenge timely and effective crisis management.<br /><br />Key messages<br /><ol><li>Challenges to evidence-informed decision making during infectious disease outbreaks are numerous but understudied</li><br /><li>Scientific uncertainty often challenges decision making and facilitates the contestation of expertise</li><br /><li>Political, economic and media pressure impact technical decision making during outbreaks</li><br /><li>Knowledge transfer can be enhanced by collaborative risk governance networks and processes</li><br /></ol>

Infectious diseases can constitute public health emergencies of international concern when a pathogen arises, acquires new characteristics, or is deliberately released, leading to the potential for loss of human lives as well as societal disruption. A wide range of risk drivers are now known to lead to and/or exacerbate the emergence and spread of infectious disease, including global trade and travel, the overuse of antibiotics, intensive agriculture, climate change, high population densities, and inadequate infrastructures, such as water treatment facilities. Where multiple risk drivers interact, the potential impact of a disease outbreak is amplified. The varying temporal and geographic frequency with which infectious disease events occur adds yet another layer of complexity to the issue. Mitigating the emergence and spread of infectious disease necessitates mapping and prioritising the interdependencies between public health and other sectors. Conversely, during an international public health emergency, significant disruption occurs not only to healthcare systems but also to a potentially wide range of sectors, including trade, tourism, energy, civil protection, transport, agriculture, and so on. At the same time, dealing with a disease outbreak may require a range of critical sectors for support. There is a need to move beyond narrow models of risk to better account for the interdependencies between health and other sectors so as to be able to better mitigate and respond to the risks posed by emerging infectious disease.

Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) commenced in April 2009. Robust planning and preparedness are needed to minimize the impact of a pandemic. This study aims to review if key elements of pandemic preparedness are included in national plans of European countries. Key elements were identified before and during the evaluations of the 2009 pandemic and are defined in this study by 42 items. These items are used to score a total of 28 publicly available national pandemic influenza plans. We found that plans published before the 2009 influenza pandemic score lower than plans published after the pandemic. Plans from countries with a small population size score significantly lower compared to national plans from countries with a big population (P < .05). We stress that the review of written plans does not reflect the actual preparedness level, as the level of preparedness entails much more than the existence of a plan. However, we do identify areas of improvement for the written plans, such as including aspects on the recovery and transition phase and several opportunities to improve coordination and communication, including a description of the handover of leadership from health to wider sector management and communication activities during the pre-pandemic phase.

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Improving preparedness in the European region requires a clear understanding of what European Union (EU) member states should be able to do, whether acting internally or in cooperation with each other or the EU and other multilateral organizations. We have developed a preparedness logic model that specifies the aims and objectives of public health preparedness, as well as the response capabilities and preparedness capacities needed to achieve them. The capabilities, which describe the ability to effectively use capacities to identify, characterize, and respond to emergencies, are organized into 5 categories. The first 3 categories—(1) assessment; (2) policy development, adaptation, and implementation; and (3) prevention and treatment services in the health sector—represent what the public health system must accomplish to respond effectively. The fourth and fifth categories represent a series of interrelated functions needed to ensure that the system fulfills its assessment, policy development, and prevention and treatment roles: (4) coordination and communication regards information sharing within the public health system, incident management, and leadership, and (5) emergency risk communication focuses on communication with the public. This model provides a framework for identifying what to measure in capacity inventories, exercises, critical incident analyses, and other approaches to assessing public health emergency preparedness, not how to measure them. Focusing on a common set of capacities and capabilities to measure allows for comparisons both over time and between member states, which can enhance learning and sharing results and help identify both strengths and areas for improvement of public health emergency preparedness in the EU.

The threat of serious, cross-border communicable disease outbreaks in Europe poses a significant challenge to public health and emergency preparedness because the relative likelihood of these threats and the pathogens involved are constantly shifting in response to a range of changing disease drivers. To inform strategic planning by enabling effective resource allocation to manage the consequences of communicable disease outbreaks, it is useful to be able to rank and prioritise pathogens. This paper reports on a literature review which identifies and evaluates the range of methods used for risk ranking. Searches were performed across biomedical and grey literature databases, supplemented by reference harvesting and citation tracking. Studies were selected using transparent inclusion criteria and underwent quality appraisal using a bespoke checklist based on the AGREE II criteria. Seventeen studies were included in the review, covering five methodologies. A narrative analysis of the selected studies suggests that no single methodology was superior. However, many of the methods shared common components, around which a 'best-practice' framework was formulated. This approach is intended to help inform decision makers' choice of an appropriate risk-ranking study design.