Chapter 4 proposes a listening-centered alternative to empathy-based approaches to deliberation. The chapter begins by discussing how the concept of listening is used in everyday language and then introduces a more systematic “theory of listening acts.” Using the categories of speech act theory to identify corresponding categories of the listening act, the author distinguishes between auditory, perauditory, and ilauditory listening. With this listening act theory, the author shows that listening is more than simply hearing what is said (auditory listening). Similarly, listening should not be equated with the outcomes it brings about, including consensus or mutual understanding (perauditory listening outcomes). We also act in listening (ilauditory listening). In listening to our fellow citizens we enact the deliberative ideal, acknowledging that their perspectives are relevant to our collective judgements and decisions. The chapter shows that fair consideration is predicated on ilauditory listening, or what the author calls “performative democratic listening.”

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This article explores the concept of deliberative uptake, which I define as the fair consideration of the arguments, stories, and perspectives that citizens share in deliberation. Reinterpreting the democratic force of deliberation, I argue that it comes in large part from uptake, rather than inclusion or influence. As I show, however, citizens often struggle to take up what others have to say, especially those with whom they disagree. These issues of what I call limited uptake undermine democratic possibilities in pluralistic societies, but are not adequately captured in discussions about how to enhance the democratic quality of deliberation. In addition to expanding inclusion, we must find ways to broaden the enactment of deliberative uptake. After explaining the nature and significance of fair consideration, I present strategies for improving and assessing deliberative uptake and address the risks of taking up undemocratic inputs.

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What is the relationship between deliberation and democracy? Despite the volumes dedicated to this question, recent admissions by prominent deliberative democrats—that we need not pursue a necessarily deliberative political system, but merely a democratic one—suggest that this remains an open question. Here, I defend the deliberative model’s staying power against those who argue that it has been set normatively adrift. Addressing concerns of “concept-stretching,” I show that the deliberative model provides much more than a defense of the practice of deliberation. Indeed, its key contribution is the answer it provides to the question of what democracy itself means in large pluralistic societies. Moreover, I show that by de-centering the practice of deliberation from deliberative theories of democracy, we can acknowledge the weakness of deliberation and the strengths of non-deliberative practices, while retaining the model’s normative commitments.