Reform-based science instruction is guided by teachers' normative beliefs. Discursive claims are how teachers say they teach science. Previous research has studied the change in teachers' beliefs and how beliefs influence intended practice and action in the classroom. Few studies have connected what teachers believe, how they say they teach, and how they actually teach in the classroom. The purpose of this study was to investigate how a teacher's normative beliefs, discursive claims, and classroom practices were related to the implementation of reform-based standards. This research study analyzed 78 secondary science teachers' beliefs and claims about teaching in a reform-based, innovative manner. A subset of teachers was observed in the classroom to determine the relationship among beliefs, claims, and implementation in the classroom. The study revealed that there is a disconnect between what science teachers believe and what they say about science teaching. A teacher with traditional normative beliefs and innovative discursive claims implemented reform-based pedagogy. Beliefs alone were not a good predictor of innovative teaching, whereas discursive claims were determined to be a better predictor for implementation of reform-based science teaching. Innovative discursive claims, regardless of the type of beliefs, resulted in innovative teaching. A NormativeDiscursive-Practice Model is proposed to guide research about beliefs and claims leading to classroom implementation. The conclusions indicate that determining teachers' discursive claims is more informative for planning professional development than determining or monitoring their beliefs.

Entrapping conflicts are those in which decision makers continue investing their resources in a costly or losing course of action in order to justify the appropriateness of already sunken costs. Given the great costs often associated with becoming entrapped, it would seem worthwhile to learn how this decision‐making process can be avoided or reduced. The present experiments addressed this issue. In Experiment 1 subjects participated in an entrapping waiting situation in which self‐focused attention should have been phenomenologically uncomfortable. To test the notion that self‐directed attention would cause reduced entrapment, half of the participants waited in the presence of a mirror whereas half did not. As predicted, subjects became significantly less entrapped in the former than in the latter condition. Experiment 2 studied whether subjects would be less likely to enter a conflict that could later prove entrapping if they were made aware beforehand of the process of entrapment. Half of the individuals in this field experiment were given a brief general description of the process of entrapment, whereas half were not. As expected, subjects were significantly less likely to enter the situation if they had been provided the information about entrapment. The implications of these and other findings are discussed.

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