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Distraction is an emotion regulation strategy that has an ambiguous status within cognitive-behavior therapy. According to some treatment protocols it is counterproductive, whereas according to other protocols it is seen as a quite useful strategy. The main purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that distraction is adaptive when combined with active acceptance, but maladaptive when combined with avoidant strategies. A non-clinical community sample of adults (N = 638) and a clinical sample (N = 172) completed measures of emotion regulation and well-being. Hierarchical cluster analysis was used to identify subgroups with different profiles on six emotion regulation variables, and these subgroups were then compared on well-being (positive and negative emotionality, and life quality) and on clinical status. A nine-cluster solution was chosen on the basis of explained variance and homogeneity coefficients. Two of these clusters had almost identical scores on distraction, but showed otherwise very different profiles (distraction combined with acceptance vs. distraction combined with avoidance). The distraction-acceptance cluster scored significantly higher than the distraction-avoidance cluster on all measures of well-being; it was also under-represented in the clinical sample, whereas the distraction-avoidance cluster was over-represented. Limitations include a cross-sectional design, and use of self-report measures. The findings suggest that distraction may be either adaptive or maladaptive, depending on whether it is combined with an attitude of acceptance or avoidance.

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The purpose of the present study was to empirically test the suggestion that experiential avoidance in an emotion regulation context is best understood as an emotion regulatory function of topographically distinct strategies. To do this we examined whether a measure of experiential avoidance could statistically account for the effects of emotion regulation strategies intervening at different points of the emotion-generative process as conceptualized by Gross' (1998) process model of emotion regulation. The strategies under examination were behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression. The specific hypotheses to be tested were (1) that behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression would statistically mediate the differences in measures of psychological well-being between a clinical and nonclinical sample, but that (2) these indirect effects would be reduced to nonsignificant levels when controlling for differences in experiential avoidance. The results provide clear support for the first hypothesis with regard to all the studied strategies. In contrast to the second hypothesis, the results showed the predicted outcome pattern only for the response-focused strategy "response suppression" and not for cognitive reappraisal or behavioral avoidance. The results are interpreted and discussed in relation to theories on experiential avoidance and emotion regulation.