A consolidated approach to the study of the mental representation of word meanings has consisted in contrasting different domains of knowledge, broadly reflecting the abstract-concrete dichotomy. More fine-grained semantic distinctions have emerged in neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience work, reflecting semantic category specificity, but almost exclusively within the concrete domain. Theoretical advances, particularly within the area of embodied cognition, have more recently put forward the idea that distributed neural representations tied to the kinds of experience maintained with the concepts' referents might distinguish conceptual meanings with a high degree of specificity, including those within the abstract domain. Here we report the results of two psycholinguistic rating studies incorporating such theoretical advances with two main objectives: first, to provide empirical evidence of fine-grained distinctions within both the abstract and the concrete semantic domains with respect to relevant psycholinguistic dimensions; second, to develop a carefully controlled linguistic stimulus set that may be used for auditory as well as visual neuroimaging studies focusing on the parametrization of the semantic space beyond the abstract-concrete dichotomy. Ninety-six participants rated a set of 210 sentences across pre-selected concrete (mouth, hand, or leg action-related) and abstract (mental state-, emotion-, mathematics-related) categories, with respect either to different semantic domain-related scales (rating study 1), or to concreteness, familiarity, and context availability (rating study 2). Inferential statistics and correspondence analyses highlighted distinguishing semantic and psycholinguistic traits for each of the pre-selected categories, indicating that a simple abstract-concrete dichotomy is not sufficient to account for the entire semantic variability within either domains.

Empathic brain responses are characterized by overlapping activations between active experience and observation of an emotion in another person, with the pattern for observation being modulated by trait empathy. Also for self-performed and observed errors, similar brain activity has been described, but findings concerning the role of empathy are mixed. We hypothesized that trait empathy modulates the processing of observed responses if expectations concerning the response are based on the beliefs of the observed person. In the present study, we utilized a false-belief task in which observed person’s and observer’s task-related knowledge were dissociated and errors and correct responses could be expected or unexpected. While theta power was generally modulated by the expectancy of the observed response, a negative mediofrontal event-related potential (ERP) component was more pronounced for unexpected observed actions only in participants with higher trait empathy (assessed by the Empathy Quotient), as revealed by linear mixed effects analyses. Cognitive and affective empathy, assessed by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, were not significantly related to the ERP component. The results suggest that trait empathy can facilitate the generation of predictions and thereby modulate specific aspects of the processing of observed actions, while the contributions of specific empathy components remain unclear.

Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of figurative language posit a difference between metaphor and metonymy in terms of underlying conceptual operations. Recently, other pragmatic uses of words have been accounted for in the Relevance Theory framework, such as approximation, described in terms of conceptual adjustment that varies in degree and direction with respect to the case of metaphor. Despite the theoretical distinctions, there is very poor experimental evidence addressing the metaphor/metonymy distinction, and none concerning approximation. Here we used meticulously built materials to investigate the interpretation mechanisms of these three phenomena through timed sensicality judgments. Results revealed that interpreting metaphors and approximations differs from literal interpretation both in accuracy and reaction times, with higher difficulty and costs for metaphors than for approximations. This suggests similar albeit gradual interpretative costs, in line with the latest account of Relevance Theory. Metonymy, on the contrary, almost equates literal comprehension and calls for a theoretical distinction from metaphor. Overall, this work represents a first attempt to provide an empirical basis for a theory-sound and psychologically-grounded taxonomy of figurative and loose uses of language.

Neuroscientific research on conceptual knowledge based on the grounded cognition framework has shed light on the organization of concrete concepts into semantic categories that rely on different types of experiential information. Abstract concepts have traditionally been investigated as an undifferentiated whole, and have only recently been addressed in a grounded cognition perspective. The present fMRI study investigated the involvement of brain systems coding for experiential information in the conceptual processing of fine-grained semantic categories along the abstract-concrete continuum. These categories consisted of mental state-, emotion-, mathematics-, mouth action-, hand action-, and leg action-related meanings. Thirty-five sentences for each category were used as stimuli in a 1-back task performed by 36 healthy participants. A univariate analysis failed to reveal category-specific activations. Multivariate pattern analyses, in turn, revealed that fMRI data contained sufficient information to disentangle all six fine-grained semantic categories across participants. However, the category-specific activity patterns showed no overlap with the regions coding for experiential information. These findings demonstrate the possibility of detecting specific patterns of neural representation associated with the processing of fine-grained conceptual categories, crucially including abstract ones, though bearing no anatomical correspondence with regions coding for experiential information as predicted by the grounded cognition hypothesis.

This study aimed to replicate and validate concreteness and context effects on semantic word processing. In Experiment 1, we replicated the behavioral findings of Hoffman et al. (Cortex 63,250–266, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2014.09.001, 2015) by applying their cueing paradigm with their original stimuli translated into German. We found concreteness and contextual cues to facilitate word processing in a semantic judgment task with 55 healthy adults. The two factors interacted in their effect on reaction times: abstract word processing profited more strongly from a contextual cue, while the concrete words’ processing advantage was reduced but still present. For accuracy, the descriptive pattern of results suggested an interaction, which was, however, not significant. In Experiment 2, we reformulated the contextual cues to avoid repetition of the to-be-processed word. In 83 healthy adults, the same pattern of results emerged, further validating the findings. Our corroborating evidence supports theories integrating representational richness and semantic control mechanisms as complementary mechanisms in semantic word processing.