The lack of recent critiques about terminology has led to the frequent misuse or confusingly varied use of the words that are more or less specific to the field of terrestrial canopy biology. I provide definitions for ca 170 terms and subterms, with translations into four languages. Rather than limit coverage to tree crowns, I define canopy biology as the study of life within any aboveground parts of all plant communities, temperate and tropical. This broadened perspective enables ecologists to consider the entire range of challenges faced by organisms living in aboveground plant life, from just above the rhizosphere to the outer limits of plant growth into the atmosphere. Further, this redefinition may reduce the potential for anthropocentric biases in interpreting life on trees or other plants; encourage the use of alternative ecosystems for hypotheses that may be difficult to address in treetops; and promote more general conceptual thinking about life on vegetation, most notably the importance of scaling in ecology. Among the salient points in terminology: the concept of "stratification" has been criticized in part because strata have been defined many ways, but a flexible application of the word is central to its utility; the source of nutrients is pivotal in distinguishing epiphytes from parasites, rather than the more general issue of an organism's effects on its host; "hemiepiphyte," as currently used, confounds two radically different life cycle strategies, suggesting a new term, "nomadic vine," to describe the strategy typical of many aroids; there is a confusion in the literature caused by varied applications of the word "climb;" locomotor terms may have to be modified as more becomes known about forces underlying limb kinematics; and studies of leaping and falling organisms tend to overemphasize arbitrary distinctions between gliding and parachuting to the detriment of the more critical issue of capacity for "controlled descent." Kq wordc

Human societies are examined as distinct and coherent groups. This trait is most parsimoniously considered a deeply rooted part of our ancestry rather than a recent cultural invention. Our species is the only vertebrate with society memberships of significantly more than 200. We accomplish this by using society-specific labels to identify members, in what I call an anonymous society. I propose that the human brain has evolved to permit not only the close relationships described by the social brain hypothesis, but also, at little mental cost, the anonymous societies within which such alliances are built. The human compulsion to discover or invent labels to "mark" group memberships may originally have been expressed in hominins as vocally learned greetings only slightly different in function from chimpanzee pant hoots (now known to be society-specific). The weight of evidence suggests that at some point, conceivably early in the hominin line, the distinct groups composed of several bands that were typical of our ancestors came to be distinguished by their members on the basis of multiple labels that were socially acquired in this way, the earliest of which would leave no trace in the archaeological record. Often overlooked as research subjects, these sizable fission-fusion communities, in recent egalitarian hunter-gatherers sometimes 2,000 strong, should consistently be accorded the status of societies, in the same sense that this word is used to describe tribes, chiefdoms, and other cultures arising later in our history. The capacity of hunter-gatherer societies to grow sufficiently populous that not all members necessarily recognize one another would make the transition to larger agricultural societies straightforward. Humans differ from chimpanzees in that societal labels are essential to the maintenance of societies and the processes giving birth to new ones. I propose that anonymous societies of all kinds can expand only so far as their labels can remain sufficiently stable.

No abstract