Objective. Despite the rich discussions about the role of information disclosure programs in environmental policy, our theoretical understanding of how and why information disclosure programs work lacks a clear framework. This article begins to fill that void by laying out some fundamental theories and concepts that underlie the empirical work on the subject. Methods. Basic theories arising from our knowledge of economics, psychology, and politics are compared. Previous research is analyzed with these theories in mind. Results. Research results confirm the plausibility of each of these theories, though the most compelling evidence so far suggests that shock and shame are key motivating factors for improved environmental performance by industry. Conclusions. The argument is made that our theoretical foundations must be understood better if we are to make sense of the empirical work on the subject. Policy implications are addressed.Starting with the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in the late 1980s and continuing today at state, federal, and international levels, governmental agencies gradually have been spending greater resources on the release of environmental information to the public. Public agencies have been collecting and disseminating environmental information about private-sector behavior that would otherwise have remained private. In particular, government is requiring that industrial pollution releases and the handling of toxic materials be tracked, measured, and catalogued. The catalogued data in turn are conveyed to government, which then makes the bulk of that information available to the general public and/or summarizes that information for public consumption.Why is industry required to report this information? What function is served? The basic answer has to do with the belief that people have a right to know this information (Sarokin and Schulkin, 1991;Roe, 2000;Hadden, 1989) and that there is something about knowing this information that could help improve public health (and the environment) and improve the environmental performance of the private sector (Kleindorfer and Orts,

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Two key components of civic environmentalism are the devolution of policy control of environmental policy from the federal government to states and localities and the increase of local citizen participation in policy decision making. Using a combination of case studies and interviews, the authors suggest that devolution of policy making and policy implementation may not increase the role of citizens. Rather, due to both the participatory mechanisms used and the larger trends in political participation in democratic societies, citizen involvement may be limited in significant ways. Although evidence is found that citizens can and do influence policy under certain circumstances, there is also cautionary evidence to suggest that this influence is not widespread and does not include representative samples of local communities. The authors conclude that for civic environmentalism to be truly civic, barriers to participation must be acknowledged and overcome.