Theories of democratic government traditionally have relied on a model of organization in which officials act impartially, accept clear lines of accountability and supervision, and define their dayto-day activities through rules, procedures, and confined discretion. In the past 10 years, however, a serious challenge to this ideal has been mounted by critics and reformers who favor market, network, or "mixed-economy" models. We assess the extent to which these new models have influenced the work orientations of frontline staff using three alternative service types-corporate, market, and network-to that proposed by the traditional, procedural model of public bureaucracy. Using surveys of frontline officials in four countries where the revolution in ideas has been accompanied by a revolution in methods for organizing government services, we measure the degree to which the new models are operating as service-delivery norms. A new corporatemarket hybrid (called "enterprise governance") and a new network type have become significant models for the organization of frontline work in public programs.

In 1998, we were witnessing major changes in frontline social service delivery across the OECD and this was theorised as the emergence of a post-Fordist welfare state. Changes in public management thinking, known as New Public Management (NPM), informed this shift, as did public choice theory. A 1998 study of Australia's then partially privatised employment assistance sector provided an ideal place to test the impact of such changes upon actual service delivery. The study concluded that frontline staff behaviour did not meet all the expectations of a post-Fordist welfare state and NPM, although some signs of specialisation, flexibility and networking were certainly evident (Considine, 1999). Ten years on, in 2008, frontline staff working in Australia's now fully privatised employment sector participated in a repeat study. These survey data showed convergent behaviour on the part of the different types of employment agencies and evidence that flexibility had decreased. In fact, in the ten years between the two studies there was a marked increase in the level of routinisation and standardisation on the frontline. This suggests that the sector did not achieve the enhanced levels of flexibility so often identified as a desirable outcome of reform. Rather, agencies adopted more conservative practices over time in response to more detailed external regulation and more exacting internal business methods.

In the standard works, accountability is defined as the legal obligation to respect the legitimate interests of others affected by decisions, programs, and interventions. This has usually meant that agencies obey those in the line of authority above them. However, the simplicity of this doctrine is often contradicted by the demands of contracting‐out and output‐based performance. Using interviews and surveys (n=1164) of front‐line officials in Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, this study examines accountability as different forms of responsiveness, obligation, and willingness to communicate with others. It compares traditional vertical accountability with new forms of horizontal recognition. The research shows that there is a high degree of regime consistency across these two dimensions. Horizontal accountability is mostly a problem when it is accompanied by competition between public and private agencies in the same policy fields.

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A corporate management framework has been the basis for a transformation of Australian public administration in recent years. Program budgeting, corporate planning, performance contracts, program evaluation and new forms of efficiency scrutiny are among the techniques introduced. They stem from a dominant paradigm of technical and instrumental rationality, within which a framework of practical remedies and technologies of power carries the corporate management label. Four concepts underly this framework and its techniques: the product format, instrumentalism, integration and purposive action. The framework has fundamental problems. The product format is inappropriate for many public services and overvalues quantifiable, single‐purpose outputs while denigrating claims of worth and effectiveness made on non‐economic grounds; instrumentalism ignores the political dimensions of public organisations; integration denies the value of decentralised forms of service development and delivery and, paradoxically, contradicts current private management precepts; and purposive action displays an unwarranted optimism about the potency of technical rationality under central direction. The four principles must be reviewed as offering few prospects for genuine and lasting reform.

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Design involves an account of expertise which foregrounds implicit, heuristic skills. Most models of policy making have a stronger interest in structural and exogenous pressures on decision making. Research suggests that high-level experts develop unique capacities to process data, read a situation, and see imaginative solutions. By linking some of the key attributes of a design model of decision making to an account of expertise, it is possible to formulate a stronger model of public policy design expertise. While other approaches often concern themselves with constraints and structural imperatives, a design approach has a focus upon the capacities of individual actors such as policy experts. Such an approach rests upon central propositions in regard to goal emergence, pattern recognition, anticipation, emotions engagement, fabulation, playfulness, and risk protection. These provide a starting point for further research and for the professional development of policy specialists.El diseño involucra un aspecto de la especialización que destaca habilidades heurísticas implícitas. La mayoría de los modelos para la elaboración de políticas tienen un fuerte interés en presiones bs_bs_banner

Innovation and innovators inhabit an institutional space, which is partially defined by formal positions and partially by informal networks. This article investigates the role of politicians and bureaucrats in fostering innovation inside government and provides an empirical explanation of who the innovators are, whether this is mostly an attribute of position or role, or mostly an effect of certain forms of networking. The study uses original data collected from 11 municipal governments in Australia in order to define and describe the normative underpinnings of innovation inside government and to show the importance of advice and strategic information networks among politicians and senior bureaucrats (n = 947). Social network analysis is combined with conventional statistical analysis in order to demonstrate the comparative importance of networks in explaining who innovates.