In the present article, we look at attitudes toward gender roles among young women and men in 36 countries with different levels of societal gender inequality. By applying multilevel models to data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009, the study contributes to our understanding of gender inequality by showing that (a) both young women and young men (in 8th grade; Mage = 14.39 years) display more gender-egalitarian attitudes in countries with higher levels of societal gender equality; (b) young women in all countries have more egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles than young men do, but (c) the gender gap in attitudes is more evident in more egalitarian contexts; and (d) a higher level of maternal education is associated with more gender-egalitarian attitudes among young women. In contrast, no statistically significant association emerges between maternal employment and young men's attitudes. Overall, the findings suggest that adolescents in different contexts are influenced by the dominant societal discourse on gender inequality, which they interiorize and display through their own attitudes toward gender roles. However, the findings also indicate that young women are more responsive to external cues than young men are. This result − coupled with the fact that young men in egalitarian contexts have not adopted gender-egalitarian attitudes to the same extent as young women − is preoccupying, as it suggests a slowdown in the achievement of societal gender equality that is still far from being reached.

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Why is the winner‐loser gap in political support wider in some countries and narrower in others? Previous studies have focused on how the input side of political systems (i.e., the institutional structure) affects the winner‐loser gap. This study suggests that one should also consider the output side (i.e., the quality of political process and economic performance) and posits that two mechanisms – rational and psychological – can explain how output factors affect the gap. Going beyond previous research, this article also considers whether contextual characteristics explain the variation in the gap not only between countries, but also within them. Applying mixed models to survey data from 30 European countries between 2002 and 2015, the study finds that the differences in support between winners and losers across countries are smaller in consensual systems, as in these contexts the support among losers is higher. However, changes in the institutional structure do not explain the over‐time variation in the winner‐loser gap. Moreover, increasing quality of process and economic performance do not attenuate the gap across countries and over time, as they affect positively the political support of both winners and losers. The study shows which contextual factors explain the winner‐loser gap and points to the conditions that increase losers’ consent, which is a crucial element of democratic legitimacy.

This article aims to demonstrate that during an economic crisis political protest increases. Recently, economic performance has suddenly worsened in Europe after a period of relative prosperity. The economic crisis affects citizens, who may turn to political protest to voice their discontent. However, the literature on social movements has often dismissed the link between economic performance and political protest, arguing that dissatisfaction is not sufficient for mobilization. Despite this argument, in the wake of the ‘Great recession’ that hit Europe, some scholars have argued that the economic crisis has been a factor in the mobilization of political protest. Nonetheless, a broad assessment of the link between the economic crisis and political protest has yet to be carried out. Based on a comparative longitudinal analysis of 25 European countries between 2000 and 2014, this article complements recent publications on the topic, and shows that economic performance, measured using both objective and subjective indicators, has a strong association with the number of political protests. The literature on the topic has not always presented conclusive results on this association. In contrast, this article provides updated and clear findings showing that the state of the economy matters for mobilization.

There are already a number of good accounts of the impact of the recent 2008–2014 economic crisis\ud on European democracies. However, no systematic assessments of how it has affected specific aspects of\ud democracy have so far been carried out. We explore its impact on European democracies in several areas\ud by adopting the ‘quality of democracy’ framework. Our analysis shows that the measures we employ capture\ud the variation in quality during this ‘troubled’ period. The empirical analysis suggests that a shrinking of private\ud and public resources due to an economic downturn prompts three reactions: (a) a general deterioration\ud of the rule of law; (b) citizens become more sensitive about what governments deliver; and (c) detachment\ud from the institutional channels of representation along with a choice to protest