We examined the role of conflict monitoring processes in forming metacognitive judgements of confidence while performing base rate tasks. Recently proposed models of dual-process reasoning, as well as research, have shown that conflict detection might represent a link between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Conflict detection has also been shown to affect metacognitive processes in reasoning tasks. By varying base rate probability and congruence, we generated base rate tasks of four distinct levels of congruence. The results of two experiments showed that participants were slower and less confident in conflict conditions regardless of their response. However, there were two distinct subsets of participants with different levels of sensitivity to conflict which resulted in different patterns of results when using low base rate ratios. In-depth analyses showed that the impact of base rate information in the formation of metacognitive judgements depended on congruence and response type. Base rate information was a more salient cue for metacognitive processes when responding according to base rates compared with responding according to belief. There is evidence that base rate information may serve as a direct cue for metacognition, independent of fluency.
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) are frequently described as the best current models of human and primate vision. An obvious challenge to this claim is the existence of adversarial images that fool DCNNs but are uninterpretable to humans. However, recent research has suggested that there may be similarities in how humans and DCNNs interpret these seemingly nonsense images. We reanalysed data from a high-profile paper and conducted five experiments controlling for different ways in which these images can be generated and selected. We show human-DCNN agreement is much weaker and more variable than previously reported, and that the weak agreement is contingent on the choice of adversarial images and the design of the experiment. Indeed, we find there are well-known methods of generating images for which humans show no agreement with DCNNs. We conclude that adversarial images still pose a challenge to theorists using DCNNs as models of human vision.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have had extraordinary successes in classifying photographic images of objects and are often described as the best models of biological vision. This conclusion is largely based on three sets of findings: (1) DNNs are more accurate than any other model in classifying images taken from various datasets, (2) DNNs do the best job in predicting the pattern of human errors in classifying objects taken from various behavioral datasets, and (3) DNNs do the best job in predicting brain signals in response to images taken from various brain datasets (e.g., single cell responses or fMRI data). However, these behavioral and brain datasets do not test hypotheses regarding what features are contributing to good predictions and we show that the predictions may be mediated by DNNs that share little overlap with biological vision. More problematically, we show that DNNs account for almost no results from psychological research. This contradicts the common claim that DNNs are good, let alone the best, models of human object recognition. We argue that theorists interested in developing biologically plausible models of human vision need to direct their attention to explaining psychological findings. More generally, theorists need to build models that explain the results of experiments that manipulate independent variables designed to test hypotheses rather than compete on making the best predictions. We conclude by briefly summarizing various promising modelling approaches that focus on psychological data.
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) are frequently described as promising models of human and primate vision. An obvious challenge to this claim is the existence of adversarial images that fool DCNNs but are uninterpretable to humans. However, recent research has suggested that there may be similarities in how humans and DCNNs interpret these seemingly nonsense images. In this study, we reanalysed data from a high-profile paper and conducted four experiments controlling for different ways in which these images can be generated and selected. We show that agreement between humans and DCNNs is much weaker and more variable than previously reported, and that the weak agreement is contingent on the choice of adversarial images and the design of the experiment. Indeed, it is easy to generate images with no agreement. We conclude that adversarial images still challenge the claim that DCNNs constitute promising models of human and primate vision.
Humans rely heavily on the shape of objects to recognise them. Recently, it has been argued that Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) can also show a shape-bias, provided their learning environment contains this bias. This has led to the proposal that CNNs provide good mechanistic models of shape-bias and, more generally, human visual processing. However, it is also possible that humans and CNNs show a shape-bias for very different reasons, namely, shape-bias in humans may be a consequence of architectural and cognitive constraints whereas CNNs show a shape-bias as a consequence of learning the statistics of the environment. We investigated this question by exploring shape-bias in humans and CNNs when they learn in a novel environment. We observed that, in this new environment, humans (i) focused on shape and overlooked many non-shape features, even when non-shape features were more diagnostic, (ii) learned based on only one out of multiple predictive features, and (iii) failed to learn when global features, such as shape, were absent. This behaviour contrasted with the predictions of a statistical inference model with no priors, showing the strong role that shape-bias plays in human feature selection. It also contrasted with CNNs that (i) preferred to categorise objects based on non-shape features, and (ii) increased reliance on these non-shape features as they became more predictive. This was the case even when the CNN was pre-trained to have a shape-bias and the convolutional backbone was frozen. These results suggest that shape-bias has a different source in humans and CNNs: while learning in CNNs is driven by the statistical properties of the environment, humans are highly constrained by their previous biases, which suggests that cognitive constraints play a key role in how humans learn to recognise novel objects.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have had extraordinary successes in classifying photographic images of objects and are often described as the best models of biological vision. This conclusion is largely based on three sets of findings: (1) DNNs are more accurate than any other model in classifying images taken from various datasets, (2) DNNs do the best job in predicting the pattern of human errors in classifying objects taken from various behavioral benchmark datasets, and (3) DNNs do the best job in predicting brain signals in response to images taken from various brain benchmark datasets (e.g., single cell responses or fMRI data). However, most behavioral and brain benchmarks report the outcomes of observational experiments that do not manipulate any independent variables, and we show that the good prediction on these datasets may be mediated by DNNs that share little overlap with biological vision. More problematically, we show that DNNs account for almost no results from psychological research. This contradicts the common claim that DNNs are good, let alone the best, models of human object recognition. We argue that theorists interested in developing biologically plausible models of human vision need to direct their attention to explaining psychological findings. More generally, theorists need to build models that explain the results of experiments that manipulate independent variables designed to test hypotheses rather than compete on predicting observational data. We conclude by briefly summarizing various promising modelling approaches that focus on psychological data.
A core challenge in neuroscience is to assess whether diverse systems represent the world similarly. Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) is an innovative approach to address this problem and has become increasingly popular across disciplines from machine learning to computational neuroscience. Despite these successes, RSA regularly uncovers difficult-to-reconcile and contradictory findings. Here we demonstrate the pitfalls of using RSA to infer representational similarity and explain how contradictory findings arise and support false inferences when left unchecked. By comparing neural representations in primate, human and computational models, we reveal two problematic phenomena that are ubiquitous in current research: a 'mimic' effect, where confounds in stimuli can lead to high RSA scores between provably dissimilar systems, and a 'modulation effect', where RSA-scores become dependent on stimuli used for testing. Since our results bear on existing findings and inferences, we provide recommendations to avoid these pitfalls and sketch a way forward.
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