Organizations often state that they value diversity. The workforce, however, is often quite homogeneous, reflecting a striking mismatch between aspirations and reality.Based on the distinction between desirability and feasibility concerns, we provide a psychological argument for this mismatch. We hypothesize that social distance influences individuals' choices regarding diversity. When being socially more distant, individuals prefer to assemble a diverse team, due to a stronger impact of pro-diversity desirability concerns. In contrast, when being socially close, individuals prefer similar team members, due to a stronger weighing of anti-diversity feasibility concerns. Four studies investigate the different decision outcomes when being socially distant compared to close. Study 1 shows that working in a diverse group is perceived as desirable, but less feasible. Study 2 investigates the impact of psychological distance on individuals' choices of working with a more different (when being socially distant) or similar partner (when being socially close). Study 3 shows that participants created a more diverse team for another person (distance condition) than for themselves (proximity condition). In Study 4, participants did not create a more diverse group for a stranger (distance condition) than for a friend (adjusted proximity condition), however, participants weighted feasibility concerns less strongly for strangers than for friends.Implications for diversity research and practice are discussed.

When individuals are undecided between options, they may flip a coin or use other aids that produce random outcomes to support decision-making. Such aids lead to clear suggestions, which, interestingly, individuals do not necessarily follow. Instead when looking at the outcome, individuals sometimes appear to like or dislike the suggestion, and then decide according to this feeling. In this manuscript we argue that such a decision aid can function as a catalyst. As it points to one option over the other, individuals focus on obtaining this option and engage in a more vivid representation of the same. By imagining obtaining the option, feelings related to the option become stronger, which then drive feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the outcome of the decision aid. We provide support for this phenomenon throughout two studies. Study 1 indicates that using a catalyst leads to stronger feelings. Study 2 replicates this finding using a different catalyst, and rules out alternative explanations. Here, participants report that after having used a catalyst, they experienced a stronger feeling of suddenly knowing what they want compared to the control group that did not use a catalyst. Implications of these results for research and practice are discussed.

When deciding between two options, settling can be difficult if one option is superior on one dimension but inferior on another. To arrive at a conclusion, people may gather further information, thereby running the risk of prolonging or blocking the decision-making process or even making suboptimal decisions. Here, we suggest that random decision aids may prove fruitful by reducing the need for further information. Five experiments (total N = 997) examined how information need is influenced after making a preliminary decision between two options and then receiving a suggestion from a random decision aid (a coin flip). Across studies, coin participants are less likely to request additional information (Study 1 and two follow-up studies, combined p = .021) and indicate a lower need for additional information (Study 2, p = .023, and Study 3, p = .001) compared to a control condition without a coin flip. Interestingly, participants do not necessarily adhere to the coin but stick to their preliminary decision as much as or even more than the control group, suggesting that the decision aid does not determine the decision outcome. This is true for hypothetical decisions between changing versus maintaining the status quo without an objectively correct solution (Studies 1, 1b, and 1c), for a decision between two options with an objectively correct solution (Study 2), and for a real monetary decision without an objectively correct solution (Study 3). Random decision aids may thus help to avoid decision blocks or the collection of too much information.

When people find it difficult to make a decision, they may opt to let chance decide. Flipping a coin, rolling a die, or using a counting-out rhyme are well-known decision aids. When individuals directly follow the aid’s suggestion, the decision aid acts as a decider. But when the decision aid elicits a felt response, such as liking or disliking the aid’s suggestion, and individuals act upon this response, the decision aid serves as a catalyst. This manuscript investigates whether and how many individuals apply these two strategies. In four studies (total N = 1135), we focus on coin flips as one of the most common decision aids and place an emphasis on the catalyst strategy. We examine (1) the frequency of previous experiences and future willingness to use a coin flip to make decisions, (2) which affective reactions accompany the coin flip when using it as catalyst, and (3) the circumstances under which individuals are more versus less likely to accept the use of a random decision-making aid to come to a decision. These results illustrate the catalyst phenomenon but also highlight the boundary conditions of individuals’ willingness to use randomness as an aid for decision making. We discuss directions for future research as well as potential applications.

This volume provides a great entry point into the vast and growing psychological literature on one of the defining problems of the early 21st century fake news and its dissemination. The chapters by leading scientists first focus on how (false) information spreads online and then examine the cognitive processes involved in accepting and sharing (false) information. The volume concludes by reviewing some of the available countermeasures. Anyone new to this area will find much here to satisfy their curiosity.