The paper represents a contribution to the ongoing discussion on regulating social media platforms (SMP) and especially Facebook, mostly fueled by a recent series of scandals such as Cambridge Analytica, which highlighted the recognized problem of Facebook’s lack of accountability. In response to the scandal, which coincided with long-expected wide-scale implementation of the EU’s GDPR, Facebook introduced a series of measures on its platform, such as improved traceability of advertisers, or greater power over one’s own data. Besides, Facebook was put under scrutiny of competition law authorities, mainly the German Bundeskartellamt. Taking into consideration all the regulatory approaches, the question remains whether sufficiently effective design for holding the SMPs accountable has been established or not. In the paper, we first outline the accountability issues SMPs currently face, namely the data handling and privacy issue, the platforms’ impact on political processes, or related monopolistic positioning. We ascertain that common denominator of these issues is the platforms’ design, which is created to achieve business objectives, while imposing substantial negative externalities on the society. Alongside, we review the platforms’ reactions, i.e. the self-regulatory measures adopted by the platforms in 2017–2018. We also specifically focus on the evaluation of the competition law as one instrument of regulating certain aspects of the platforms, especially in light of the recent German Bundeskartellamt decision on Facebook. We claim that most of the measures and current instruments, although improving the lack of accountability, fall short of addressing the core issue of Facebook’s status – absence of scrutiny over the platform’s design.
Competition law serves as an important tool for regulation of undertakings. In order to conduct a competition law analysis, one must first define the relevant market. However, this task is becoming more intricate in today’s digital era, especially in relation to so-called zero-price markets. These markets are characterised as markets where users of products or services do not pay for the use, at least they do not pay by money. This paper asks how to define relevant market in such case. Three methods of relevant market definition are presented, namely qualitative analysis, SSNIP test and SSNDQ test. The paper briefly explores positive and negative elements of these tests and compares the findings with the European Commission’s 2019 report. It leads to the answer that qualitative method might have certain advantages in this regard.
Th is paper deals with possible avenues for enforcement liability of human rights violations that occur in less industrially developed countries. Since food, clothing and other economic goods are oft en produced in states where the rule of law may not be as eff ective as elsewhere, it is diffi cult to both establish and remedy the human rights violations that are frequently seen to occur in such states. Th erefore, the paper analyses whether it would be possible to remedy human rights violations from abroad, in other words from within those states where these products are sold to end-users. Th e paper focuses on selected instruments of international, European and national law in order to establish whether a remedy for such violations is present. It takes the bottom-up principle, i.e. it concentrates on such instruments which might be used by individuals, consumers in particular, rather than by states. Th e outcome of the contrib ution is that, in theory, it is possible to hold retailers partially liable for human rights violations as a means of applying remote leverage on the manufacturers.
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