Schneider]Multidimensional empirical examinations of the adoption of innovations in organizations, and the influence of factors within each dimension on the phases of adoption, are scarce. This study examines the effects of environmental, organizational and top managers' characteristics on the initiation, adoption decision and implementation of innovation. Using a sample of approximately 1200 public organizations in the United States, we found that while each dimension accounts for unique variance in the adoption of innovation, organizational characteristics and top managers' attitudes toward innovation have a stronger influence than environmental and top managers' demographic characteristics. We also found no difference in the direction of effects of any antecedent, but did find differences in the significance of effects of several antecedents, on the phases of innovation adoption. We discuss the implications of these findings and suggest ideas for future research.

Studies of the association between innovation characteristics and innovation adoption at the level of organization are scarce. This study develops direct and moderating hypotheses for the relationship between innovation characteristics, manager characteristics, and innovation adoption in public organizations. The hypotheses are tested using survey data on the adoption of 25 innovations in 725 local governments in the United States and data from a panel of experts. The findings suggest that both innovation characteristics and manager characteristics influence the adoption of innovation; however, they do not reveal significant moderating effects of manager characteristics on the relationship between innovation characteristics and innovation adoption. The implications of the findings are discussed for further research on innovation adoption in the public sector.

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Organizations are evolving from the bureaucratic form based upon hierarchy to the new-form or radix organization that has the value chain as its relatively fluid foundation. This article explores the relationship between the radix organization and leadership, viewed through an organization-environment coevolution framework. It explicates the changes in the leader's role-sets and relationships brought about with the evolution from bureaucracy to the radix organization, developing a model of leadership that is referred to as the stakeholder model of organizational leadership. Stakeholder theory provides the appropriate theoretical basis for this model, as it offers the flexibility to accommodate various leader relationships. The stakeholder model of organizational leadership helps to predict leader effectiveness in organizations characterized by fuzzy organizational boundaries, flattened hierarchies, and work relationships sometimes brought about through contracts instead of employment.

Public choice theory (PCT) assumes that elected officials and public administrators act in their self-interest, not in the public interest. This article tests the theory regarding the effects of public governance on U.S. public pension plans, which are increasingly important socioeconomic institutions. The authors develop several PCT-based hypotheses regarding the dependent variable of plan funding, a measure of plan performance. Data sources include biennial PENDAT survey data for [1992][1993][1994][1995][1996]. The results indicate limited support for PCT. A positive relationship between the presence of boards of trustees and plan funding is found, but no relationship between citizen voting and plan funding.Within the past few decades, earlier projections regarding the potential growth and impact of institutional owners (Berle, 1959;Drucker, 1976;Herman, 1981) have come to fruition. Nearly 60% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S. companies is now owned by financial institutions (Useem, 1998). This relatively concentrated ownership enables institutional owners to be a significant force in financial markets, where institutional trading has been associated with increased price swings and market volatility (Brown & Brooke, 1993;Norris, 1996;Schwartz, 1991). Studies indicate that some institutional owners, particularly public pension plans and select mutual funds, actively assert their power by influencing the strategy of targeted firms in hopes of improving corporate performance