Recent application of theories of embodied or grounded cognition to the recognition and interpretation of facial expression of emotion has led to an explosion of research in psychology and the neurosciences. However, despite the accelerating number of reported findings, it remains unclear how the many component processes of emotion and their neural mechanisms actually support embodied simulation. Equally unclear is what triggers the use of embodied simulation versus perceptual or conceptual strategies in determining meaning. The present article integrates behavioral research from social psychology with recent research in neurosciences in order to provide coherence to the extant and future research on this topic. The roles of several of the brain's reward systems, and the amygdala, somatosensory cortices, and motor centers are examined. These are then linked to behavioral and brain research on facial mimicry and eye gaze. Articulation of the mediators and moderators of facial mimicry and gaze are particularly useful in guiding interpretation of relevant findings from neurosciences. Finally, a model of the processing of the smile, the most complex of the facial expressions, is presented as a means to illustrate how to advance the application of theories of embodied cognition in the study of facial expression of emotion.

The judgment that a smile is based on "true," usually positive, feelings affects social interaction. However, the processes underlying the interpretation of a smile as being more or less genuine are not well understood. The aim of the present research was to test predictions of the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) proposed by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010). In addition to the perceptual features that can guide the judgment of a smile as genuine, the model identifies the conditions that the judgments rely on: (a) the embodiment of the facial expression and its corresponding state, and (b) beliefs about the situations in which genuine smiles are most often expressed. Results of two studies are consistent with the model in that they confirm the hypotheses that facial mimicry provides feedback that is used to judge the meaning of a smile, and that beliefs about the situations in which a smile occurs guides such judgments when mimicry is inhibited.

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The set of 30 stimulating commentaries on our target article helps to define the areas of our initial position that should be reiterated or else made clearer and, more importantly, the ways in which moderators of and extensions to the SIMS can be imagined. In our response, we divide the areas of discussion into (1) a clarification of our meaning of “functional,” (2) a consideration of our proposed categories of smiles, (3) a reminder about the role of top-down processes in the interpretation of smile meaning in SIMS, (4) an evaluation of the role of eye contact in the interpretation of facial expression of emotion, and (5) an assessment of the possible moderators of the core SIMS model. We end with an appreciation of the proposed extensions to the model, and note that the future of research on the problem of the smile appears to us to be assured.

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Three studies examine two routes by which mortality threats may lead to stereotyping. Mortality salience may activate both a comprehension goal and an enhancement goal. Enhancement goals are likely to be more active in situations where intergroup competition or conflict is salient. If this is not the case, then a comprehension goal will predominate. In line with a why-determines-how logic, when mortality salience activates a comprehension goal, both positive and negative stereotyping occur. In contrast, the activation of an enhancement goal only increases negative stereotyping.

In previous research on the effects of accessible information on social judgments, divergent explanations have been offered for contrast effects that occur as a consequence of prime awareness. Some authors favor a comparison explanation, whereas others favor a correction explanation. In two studies, we successfully disentangled comparison and correction contrast by demonstrating that whereas correction for unwanted influences is a general process that leads to contrast on various dimensions on which a target is judged, comparison effects are prime specific and occur mainly on comparison relevant dimensions. In addition, our findings indicate that for correction attempts to occur and succeed, respondents must have the feeling that these primes contaminate their target judgments and should be removed from their ''true'' reaction to the target. When people are not suspicious of the potential contaminating influences of priming stimuli, prime awareness is more likely to lead to prime-target comparisons than to correction efforts.

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