Causal effect, Credit rationing, Difference-in-difference, SME, State-fund guarantee, G14, G21, G28, L26,

In this article, we revise the estimation of the dose-response function described in Hirano and Imbens (2004, Applied Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference from Incomplete-Data Perspectives, 73-84) by proposing a flexible way to estimate the generalized propensity score when the treatment variable is not necessarily normally distributed. We also provide a set of programs that accomplish this task. To do this, in the existing doseresponse program (Bia and Mattei, 2008, Stata Journal 8: 354-373), we substitute the maximum likelihood estimator in the first step of the computation with the more flexible generalized linear model.

In this article, we describe tvdiff, a community-contributed command that implements a generalization of the difference-in-differences estimator to the case of binary time-varying treatment with pre- and postintervention periods. tvdiff is flexible and can accommodate many actual situations, enabling the user to specify the number of pre- and postintervention periods and a graphical representation of the estimated coefficients. In addition, tvdiff provides two distinct tests for the necessary condition of the identification of causal effects, namely, two tests for the so-called parallel-trend assumption. tvdiff is intended to simplify applied works on program evaluation and causal inference when longitudinal data are available.

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In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.

We illustrate how the desire to live in a fair society that rewards individual effort and hard work triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well off to prefer higher taxes and the poor to reject extreme progressivity. We then provide evidence of these behaviors using a nationally representative survey from Italy. Our empirical analysis confirms that a stronger aversion to unfair distributive outcomes is associated with a higher support for redistribution by individuals with high income and to a lower demand for redistribution by those with low income.