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Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in terms of best reply dynamics, in which each player myopically uses the best response to her opponent's last move. Existing research shows that convergence can be problematic when there are best reply cycles. Here we calculate how typical this is by studying the space of all possible two-player normal form games and counting the frequency of best reply cycles. The two key parameters are the number of moves, which defines how complicated the game is, and the anti-correlation of the payoffs, which determines how competitive it is. We find that as games get more complicated and more competitive, best reply cycles become dominant. The existence of best reply cycles predicts non-convergence of six different learning algorithms that have support from human experiments. Our results imply that for complicated and competitive games equilibrium is typically an unrealistic assumption. Alternatively, if for some reason "real" games are special and do not possess cycles, we raise the interesting question of why this should be so.JEL codes: C62, C63, C73, D83.

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Agent-based models (ABMs) are increasingly used in the management sciences. Though useful, ABMs are often critiqued: it is hard to discern why they produce the results they do and whether other assumptions would yield similar results. To help researchers address such critiques, we propose a systematic approach to conducting sensitivity analyses of ABMs. Our approach deals with a feature that can complicate sensitivity analyses: most ABMs include important non-parametric elements, while most sensitivity analysis methods are designed for parametric elements only. The approach moves from charting out the elements of an ABM through identifying the goal of the sensitivity analysis to specifying a method for the analysis. We focus on four common goals of sensitivity analysis: determining whether results are robust, which elements have the greatest impact on outcomes, how elements interact to shape outcomes, and which direction outcomes move when elements change. For the first three goals, we suggest a combination of randomized finite change indices calculation through a factorial design. For direction of change, we propose a modification of individual conditional expectation (ICE) plots to account for the stochastic nature of the ABM response. We illustrate our approach using the Garbage Can Model, a classic ABM that examines how organizations make decisions.

We offer a new approach to understanding convergence to equilibrium in game theory, inspired by ecology and statistical mechanics.