Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic commentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the συµφωνία in the history of philosophy. This article considers a particular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aristotle’s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas’ and Aristotle’s words.This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegetical strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, provided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius.
Physics 1.5-9 is of crucial interest for our understanding of Aristotle's theory of nature since it contains some basic statements about the principles of becoming. In 1.5, Aristotle reminds us that all natural philosophers acknowledged the role of contraries in change because all changes go from one contrary to another. Then, in 1.6-7, he distinguishes three (and only three) principles involved in change: the two contraries plus the substance. Finally, in 1.8-9, tackling the position of Parmenides and those like him (including Plato), he discusses the possibility of coming to be from something that is not: as every substance has many attributes, some that are and others that are not, what is can, in a sense, come to be from what is not. Accordingly, matter, the substratum of change, cannot be confused with privation, which is a nonbeing per se.Commenting on these chapters, Simplicius first stresses the definition of principles: "principles must not come from each other nor from other things and all must come from them" (188a27-28). Then he emphasises the agreement among ancient philosophers on this point, going further than Aristotle. Quoting the 1st century BC Platonist Eudorus, he reports that Pythagoreans assumed two contrary principles deriving from a first One-the lower One and the Indefinite Dyad-which they considered to be the elements of all things (the second One would later be identified with the Platonic Forms in the Commentary on 1.7, when quoting Moderatus' striking fragment). Commenting on 1.6, Simplicius goes on to insist on the general agreement about the necessity of admitting three principles for explaining change. From his perspective, when Plato talks about the active cause of change, the Form, as one, and matter as two, he is basically not in disagreement with Aristotle, who also acknowledges that the substratum is two (being matter and privation), whereas form is one. Going on with matter and privation, Simplicius deals with the receptacle of the Timaeus, making things collude with the alleged Pythagorean Timaeus (on I.7). In his view, Plato's khôra corresponds exactly to Aristotle's substratum (matter), which allows change from a contrary to another. These considerations gave Simplicius the opportunity of a digression, which consists in a history of the concept of matter (including Moderatus' fragment).Finally, in 1.8 and 1.9, Simplicius reconciles Plato's Sophist with Parmenides, despite their obvious disagreement about non-being. Simplicius argues first that the Aristotelian distinction between being potentially and being actually © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi �0.��63/�87�5473-��34��8�
Chargé de conférences Les interprétations néoplatoniciennes du Phédon de PlatonPartant des Commentaires sur le Phédon de Platon écrits dans le contexte scolaire du néoplatonisme tardif à Athènes et à Alexandrie, les conférences de cette année ont pris pour objet la définition de la philosophie comme μελέτη θανάτου (comme exercice de mort). Elles se sont ainsi concentrées sur l'analyse des paragraphes 48-137 du premier commentaire de Damascius et sur les leçons 2-7 de celui d'Olympiodore. Il s'est agi de comprendre la place du Phédon au sein du cursus néoplatonicien au vu d'une interprétation qui considère ce moment comme le tournant cathartique dans la conversion philosophique. I. La mort comme séparation d'après le PhédonDans le Phédon, Platon décrit la vie philosophique comme un exercice consistant à mourir et à être mort 1 . La mort est en effet la séparation de l'âme et la fin de la vie soumise aux affections du corps. S'exercer à être mort, c'est délier autant que possible l'âme du corps, qui donne des choses un aspect imprécis, mêlé de sensation (65e-66a), et asservit l'âme par ses affections (66d). Le corps perturbe donc l'activité propre à l'âme et fait obstacle à la pensée (65b-c). Dès lors, pour connaître purement les choses, il faut se débarrasser de tout mélange afin de les saisir au moyen de l'âme seule, dans sa pureté (67a-b).La μελέτη θανάτου indique un déplacement de l'attention, depuis le corps vers l'âme, en même temps que du sens habituel attribué à la mort. L'ambition est moins morale qu'intellectuelle : il s'agit de définir le philosophe comme celui qui sépare l'âme du corps, la ramassant en elle-même afin qu'elle s'élance vers l'objet de son désir. Le Phédon examine le philosophe tant dans le rapport qu'il entretient à lui-même, à son âme, que dans celui qui le lie à ce qui lui est (immédiatement) extérieur, le corps. Il détermine ainsi l'attitude à adopter face à la vie et à la mort. S'exercer à mourir, c'est apprendre à se séparer -à se purifier -de tout ce qui nous relie au corps. II. Le Phédon en tant que dialogue cathartiqueDepuis Jamblique, le Phédon occupe la troisième marche du cursus platonicien, celle de la vertu cathartique 2 . Pour les commentateurs, il est d'abord cathartique par son propos et son but -son σκοπός : il ne se contente pas de décrire un type de 1. Platon, Phédon, 63-64a ; 67d ; 67e ; 80e-81a. 2. Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon,.
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