This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.

We analyze from an empirical point of view the evolution and determinants of Spanish regional public debt. Spain offers an interesting case study because of its high level of fiscal decentralization, implemented gradually during the past four decades, the parallel entry into force of a number of national fiscal rules in that period, and the heterogeneity of its regions, both in terms of economic fundamentals and some institutional features. Our main findings are the following: (i) on average, over the sample of study, regional governments’ fiscal policies reacted to public debt increase; (ii) fiscal rules played a limited role in controlling debt surges; (iii) a higher degree of regional fiscal coresponsibility tends to be linked to more subdued debt dynamics; (iv) market disciple has encouraged some fiscal restraint at the regional level; and (v) increases in public commercial debt have affected the standard debt.

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