Abstract:In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thresholds for switching action that relate to the two-player setup of the games. This structure of equilibria is considerably reduced when turning to incomplete information, in a setup in which players only know the distribution of the number of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player can choose her preferred action, whereas if one of the identities is in the minority frustration ensues.
We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but where not all have a preference for the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who have the same preferences. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps people individually, hurts society.
Over the past 30 years, James Andreoni has produced a body of work like few others in public economics. Motivated by a personal need to understand the determinants of prosocial behavior, and by offering a rare blend of insights from formal theory, controlled experiments, and field data, Andreoni has succeeded in elucidating the broader relevance of prosocial motives and their far‐reaching economic implications. This article offers an overview of his work on prosociality, highlighting some of his seminal contributions and placing them in a historical context. We argue that James Andreoni has had a unique role in the quest to ensure that others have a place in our utility functions.
This paper studies the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats and promises. We develop a model of strategic communication, based on theconflict game with perfect information, in which a noisycommitment messageis sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both. Our model captures different levels of aligned-preferences, for which classical games such asstag hunt,hawk-dove, andprisoner’s dilemmaare particular cases. We characterise the Bayesian perfect equilibrium with nonbinding messages undertruth-telling beliefsandsender’s bargaining powerassumptions. Through our equilibrium selection we show that the less conflict the game has, the more informative the equilibrium signal is and less credibility is necessary to implement it.
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