This paper explores the role of textual disclosures in the Management, Discussion, and Analysis (MD&A) section of a firm's SEC 10-K filing in predicting a firm's ability to continue as a going concern. Using a sample of firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1995 and 2012 to identify firms that cease as a going concern, we find that both management's opinion about going concern reported in the MD&A and the linguistic tone of the MD&A together provide significant explanatory power in predicting whether a firm will cease as a going concern. Moreover, the predictive ability of MD&A disclosure is incremental to financial ratios, market-based variables, and even the auditor's going concern opinion. We also find that the incremental predictive ability of MD&A disclosures extends to three years prior to bankruptcy.
We study whether relative power in the chief executive officer (CEO)–chief financial officer (CFO) relationship influences CEO compensation. To operationalize relative power of a CEO over a CFO, we define CFO co-option as the appointment of a CFO after a CEO assumes office. We find that CFO co-option is associated with a CEO pay premium of about 10%, which is concentrated more in the early years of the co-opted CFO’s tenure and in components of compensation that vary with the achievement of analyst-based earnings targets. Our evidence also indicates that a primary channel through which CEO power over a co-opted CFO yields the achievement of earnings targets is the use of earnings management to inflate earnings. Co-opted CFOs rely primarily on using discretionary accruals to manage earnings prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley regulatory intervention and switch to real-activities manipulation afterward. The evidence thus suggests that the form of earnings management depends on costs imposed on the CFO to inflate earnings. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency's (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors' perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from corporate bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative (i.e. textual) information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, consistent with theoretical predictions in prior literature, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets. v I dedicate this work to my wife, Archana; to my parents, Sethuraman and Jayalakshmi; and to my brothers, Rajan and Krishna. Their support and encouragement have been invaluable.
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