The British colonial administration created a hybrid legal system in Nigeria where English, Islamic and customary laws apply. The English system, having a written constitution, was made dominant and the other laws apply to the extent permitted by it. However, Muslims in the northern part of the country have been making efforts to reverse this dominance, including the recent re-introduction of Islamic criminal law by 12 states. This effort is seen to be revolutionary, reverting the states to the position when Islamic law applied in full, devoid of colonial influence. This article asks whether this can break the legal hybridity and answers in the negative, arguing instead that the effort accentuates the hybridity. For example, the re-introduction of Islamic criminal law is enabled by the constitution, the constitution institutionalises the hybridity and the 12 states operate, and are bound by, the constitution. The article discusses other variables depicting the hybridity and concludes that it was a conscious colonial act, nearly impossible to break.
This article explores the use of law in development at two levels in Nigeria. Development as a state duty has been provided for under the constitution, thereby creating socio-economic rights for citizens, albeit rights which are unenforceable. Seven development policies drawn up at different times have all also invoked law in one way or another to facilitate the achievement of their respective objectives. Both cases reflect the international trend in their respective discourses. The first approach mirrors the international human rights regime, while the second mimics international development discourse. While the instrumental use of law is desirable, this article argues that it is inadequate. More needs to be done to supplement it. First, courts need to adopt a radical interpretation of the constitutional provisions to make socio-economic rights enforceable. Secondly, people need to be active citizens through participation in the development process.
The powers of impeachment provided under the Nigerian constitution provide a means of checking the excesses of certain executive officers who enjoy the privilege of constitutional immunity against civil or criminal proceedings while they remain in office. Instead of being invoked in appropriate circumstances, however, this article shows that these powers have been abused. It examines cases of impeachment at the state level during the Obasanjo administration and shows how constitutional provisions were flagrantly breached. It provides evidence that the federal government was complicit in such cases, even though under the federal structure by which Nigeria operates, impeachment at the state level is exclusively a state business. It argues that the abuses are a symptom of imbalance of power between the executive and the legislature as well as evidence of the limits of constitutionalism in the face of politics.
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