No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This research analyzes the strategies and behaviors of political action committees (PACs) and political parties with regard to campaign contributions to state legislative candidates. Utilizing data from three states-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, we find that PACs contribute disproportionately to incumbents, with little regard to the expected competitiveness of the election. We also find evidence that PACs are somewhat more likely to fund members of the majority party. In contrast, we find that political party organizations exhibit a different strategy, and that this strategy varies according to the minority/majority status of the legislative party. Specifically, we find minority parties develop an &dquo;additive&dquo; strategy, one aimed at increasing their numbers in the legislature. Majority parties are more likely to develop a &dquo;protectionist&dquo; strategy, one which favors incumbents, especially vulnerable incumbents.The purpose of this article is to analyze the strategies of political action committees (PACs) and political parties in making contributions to state legislative election campaigns. It is intended to advance our understanding of the financing of state legislative election campaigns through the collection and analysis of comparable data from recent legislative elections in three states: