The stomatogastric nervous system of the reptantian Decapoda Crustacea, particularly the small isolated stomatogastric ganglion containing the 25-30 motor neurons that control the muscles of the gastric mill and the pyloric filter of the stomach, is an important preparation for research in comparative neurophysiology. Unfortunately there are no comprehensive descriptions of the neuromuscular system of the stomach in these animals. Therefore, since the stomatogastric motor neurons are identified by reference to the muscles they innervate, it has been difficult to identify neurons within or between species. The most important features for classifying the muscles of the decapod stomach are the ossicles to which the muscles attach. In the latter part of the last century Mocquard demonstrated that the stomach ossicles of the decapods could be compared in different groups despite the large variations from group to group. A summary of Mocquard’s (1883) classification scheme, with some modifications, is given. The scheme recognizes 33 ossicles in seven categories (cardiac gastric mill, I—VII; lateral supporting cardiac ossicles, VIII-XV ; ossicles of the cardio-pyloric valve, XVI-XVIII; supporting ossicles of the dorsal pyloric stomach, XIX -XXI; supporting ossicles of the ventral pylorus and ampullae, XXII-XXVII; supra-ampullary ossicles, XXVIII-XXX ; supporting ossicles of the lateral pylorus, XXXI-XXXIII). Where necessary, comments are then made on the ossicles of the three divergent species studied, the blue crab, Callinectes sapidus (Brachyura); the lobster, Homarus americanus (Macrura) and the spiny lobster Panulirus argus (Palinura). Most of the thirty-three ossicles are found in each of the species, but there are some major differences between species. Callinectes , for example, has the most complex ossicle system and Panulirus the most reduced.

The term "dual-use" traditionally has been used to describe technologies that could have both civilian and military usage, but this term has at least three different dimensions that pose a dilemma for modern biology and its possible misuse for hostile purposes: (1) ostensibly civilian facilities that are in fact intended for military or terrorist bioweapons development and production; (2) equipment and agents that could be misappropriated and misused for biological weapons development and production; and (3) the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge that could be misapplied for biological weapons development and production. These three different aspects of the "dual-use dilemma" are frequently confused--each demands a distinct approach within a "web of prevention" in order to reduce the future risk of bioterrorism and biowarfare. This article discusses the nature of the different perspectives and divergent approaches as a contribution to finding a scientifically acceptable global solution to the problem posed by the dual-use dilemma. We propose that: (1) facilities that are intended for bioweapons development and production should be primarily prevented by a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) effectively implemented in all nation states, one that includes provisions for adequate transparency to improve confidence and a mechanism for thorough inspections when there is sufficient cause, and enhanced law enforcement activities involving international cooperation and sharing of critical intelligence information; (2) potentially dual-use equipment and agents should be available to legitimate users for peaceful purposes, but strengthened national biosafety and physical and personnel biosecurity controls in all nations together with effective export controls should be implemented to limit the potential for the misappropriation of such equipment and materials; and (3) information should be openly accessible by the global scientific community, but a culture of responsible conduct involving the breadth of the international life sciences communities should be adopted to protect the ongoing revolution in the life sciences from being hijacked for hostile misuse of the knowledge generated and communicated by life scientists.

Advances in biological engineering are likely to have substantial impacts on global society. To explore these potential impacts we ran a horizon scanning exercise to capture a range of perspectives on the opportunities and risks presented by biological engineering. We first identified 70 potential issues, and then used an iterative process to prioritise 20 issues that we considered to be emerging, to have potential global impact, and to be relatively unknown outside the field of biological engineering. The issues identified may be of interest to researchers, businesses and policy makers in sectors such as health, energy, agriculture and the environment.

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