No abstract

P rior research documents the value of network relationships to firm behavior but is relatively silent on how networks influence opportunism in distribution channels. Focusing on a common type of distribution networks in which multiple distributors serve a single, dominant supplier, this study moves beyond a dyadic view to examine how a focal distributor's relational and structural embeddedness in such a distribution network influences its opportunism toward the dominant supplier. In particular, we postulate that a distributor's relational embeddedness in the network curbs its opportunism, whereas its network centrality, as a form of structural embeddedness in the network, promotes its opportunism. Moreover, we propose that relational embeddedness magnifies the role of a focal distributor's dependence on the supplier in suppressing the distributor's opportunism, whereas network centrality buffers such a role. We first empirically test these hypotheses using data collected from car dealers in China; the results provide support for the hypotheses. We then develop an analytical model to validate and further explain the underlying mechanisms of the network effects. Our analytical results not only validate the empirical results but also provide guidance for managers on controlling opportunism in distribution networks.

A major challenge to supply chain management in emerging markets is the relational coordination problem arising from variations in sub‐national institutions in which partners are situated. This study investigates role hazard, a critical yet understudied relational coordination problem. Drawing on role and institutional theories, we examine role ambiguity and role conflict as two facets of role hazard between buyer and supplier, their institutional source, performance outcomes, and firms’ action alignment mechanisms as potential remedies. A dyadic survey of buyers and suppliers in China reveals that both role ambiguity and role conflict can result from sub‐national institutional distance and jeopardize supply chain performance. The results also suggest that supply chain partners in different sub‐national institutions can mitigate role hazard through continuous information sharing and dynamic adaptation. This study provides novel insights into how buyers and suppliers can enhance their relational coordination in emerging markets by reducing role hazard caused by sub‐national institutional distance.

Despite the prominence of social ties in emerging economies, it remains unclear whether and how social ties matter in cultivating marketing channels for both local and foreign firms in China. Moreover, few studies have explicitly distinguished and examined the roles of business versus political ties. Drawing on the resource-based view and social network theory, the authors propose and test the moderating effects of political ties and business ties on channel capability-performance relationships. The findings from a survey of 342 firms indicate that the value of channel capability is conditional on political and business ties, but in opposite directions: business ties impede and political ties strengthen the effect of channel capability on firm performance. Furthermore, the moderating role of social ties is stronger for local, nonleading firms than for foreign, leading firms.

In a distribution network, a punishment event not only affects the disciplined distributor but also changes the attitudes and behaviors of others in the network (i.e., observers). By moving beyond a dyadic view of punishment, this article considers the effects of punishment on observers and integrates insights from social learning, fairness heuristic, and social network theories. The resulting framework of the observer effects of punishment in a distribution network, empirically tested with a survey in China, reveals two mechanisms through which punishment leads to reduced observer opportunism: (1) a direct deterrence effect and (2) a trust-building process. Moreover, two information-related constructs moderate the observer effects differently. The disciplined distributor's relational embeddedness, which motivates greater information flow to observers, aggravates the problem of information asymmetry against the manufacturer, making punishment less deterrent for observers. In contrast, the manufacturer's monitoring capability, which reduces information asymmetry, strengthens observer effects. The authors discuss both theoretical and managerial implications of using punishment to achieve collaboration from a wide network of channel members.