In this article we argue that a widespread adoption of nudging can alter legal and political institutions. Debates on nudges thus far have largely revolved around a set of philosophical theories that we call individualistic approaches. Our analysis concerns the ways in which adherents of nudging make use of the newest findings in the behavioral sciences for the purposes of policy-making. We emphasize the fact that most nudges proposed so far are not a part of the legal system and are also nonnormative. We propose two ideal types: Blaw-as-normative^and Blaw-asinstrumental^, that allow us to understand and evaluate the relation of nudges and the law. We stress the importance of law as a safeguard for the possible negative consequences of nudges and conclude with proposals that could complement nudging policies.
Public policy is increasingly informed by insights from the behavioural sciences. We highlight three aspects of behavioural public policy which can be incompatible with democratic ethics. First, policymakers can use behavioural instruments such as nudges to steer citizens' behaviour without giving reasons and by relying on non-participatory research methods. Second, behavioural public policy is frequently implemented in the form of administrative discretion by organisations which are not under direct democratic control. Third, behavioural public policy currently relies on a partial and narrow view of the behavioural sciences and is inattentive about value judgements already embedded in the research it draws upon.
, as well as audiences of: Philosophy of Science Seminar and TINT Brown Bag Seminar at the University of The normative decision theory in economics: A philosophy of science perspective. The case of the expected utility theory. This article analyses how normative decision theory is understood by economists. The paradigmatic example of normative decision theory, discussed in the article, is the expected utility theory. It has been suggested that the status of the expected utility theory has been ambiguous since early in its history. The theory has been treated as descriptive, normative, or both. This observation is the starting point for the analysis presented here. The text discusses various ways in which economists and philosophers of economics have conceptualized the normative status of the expected utility theory, and it shows that none is satisfactory from the point of view of philosophy of science.
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