The concept of “structural injustice” has a long intellectual lineage, but Iris Marion Young popularised the term in her late work in the 2000s. Young’s theory tapped into the zeitgeist of the time, providing a credible way of thinking about transnational and domestic injustices, illuminating the importance of political, economic and social structures in generating injustice, theorising the role of individuals in perpetuating structural injustice, and the responsibility of everyone to try to correct it. Young’s theory has inspired secondary and novel research. In this paper, I outline the main topics in this recent literature: what structural injustice is, responsibility for structural injustice, acting on responsibility, avoiding responsibility, and historical injustice. I conclude by noting how the influence of structural injustice theory is spreading beyond the confines of political theory. Any field that is concerned with structural inequalities, disadvantage, or oppression, can utilize structural injustice theory.
Contemporary political theory is a game. Individuals compete to publish in ‘top’ journals, to amass greater numbers of publications than their peers; then journal-ranking is combined with number of publications generating scores. The aim is to get the most points. Whoever gets the most points wins: they get the best jobs and the most prestige. This Hunger Games–like contest has serious consequences for people’s lives, determining who can make a living from academia, who will be relegated to the academic precariat or forced out of the profession. In this article, I argue that, aside from the chilling effect that job insecurity and the gamification of academia has on the precariat, these conditions are stifling intellectual creativity, diversity, and dissent in political theory/philosophy. I discuss how privatization and deregulation of universities has created unbearable working conditions, why academics are forced to publish in so-called top journals and why this is detrimental to our field, marginalizing people, topics, and methodologies these journals do not support (which usually align with already structurally marginalized peoples and modes of knowledge). I explain why we are engaging in this game and how it perpetuates itself. I conclude with some suggestions for breaking this vicious cycle, as well as a discussion of who is really benefitting from it, namely, the corporate elites who run many universities and most academic publishers.
On Iris Marion Young's “social connection model” of responsibility, individuals bear political responsibility to collectively organize against structural injustices to which they are connected. After situating Young's theory in relation to the global distributive justice and global poverty debates, I ask: what is ‘structural injustice”? What does “connection” to injustice consist of and why does it matter? How does the social connection model of responsibility differ from standard conceptions of responsibility? And what is “political responsibility”?
If Third World women form ‘the bedrock of a certain kind of global exploitation of labour,’ as Chandra Mohanty argues, how can our theoretical definitions of exploitation account for this? This paper argues that liberal theories of exploitation are insufficiently structural and that Marxian accounts are structural but are insufficiently intersectional. What we need is a structural and intersectional definition of exploitation in order to correctly identify global structural exploitation. Drawing on feminist, critical race/post-colonial and post-Fordist critiques of the Marxist definition and the intersectional accounts of Maria Mies and Iris Marion Young, this paper offers the following definition of structural exploitation: structural exploitation refers to the forced transfer of the productive powers of groups positioned as socially inferior to the advantage of groups positioned as socially superior. Global structural exploitation is a form of global injustice because it is a form of oppression.
Upon what empirical basis did Hobbes make his claims about the 'state of nature'? He looked to 'the savage people in many places of America' (Hobbes, 1976: 187). Most people now recognize Hobbes's assertions about Native Americans as racist. And yet, as Widerquist and McCall argue in their book Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy, the myth that life outside the state is unbearable and that life under the state is better remains the essential premise of two of the most influential Western political philosophies in the modern world-social contract theory (contractarianism) and property rights theory (propertarianism). Critiques of these philosophies are not new. But what is new, and exciting, about this book is that a political philosopher (Karl Widerquist) enlists an anthropologist (Grant S. McCall) to systematically debunk this founding myth on the basis of empirical evidence. Despite some confusion about the book's aims, the lack of attention to women and the risk of epistemic injustice, the results are fascinating and, I will argue, should prompt a methodological crisis for some schools of political philosophy.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.