In this paper, a solar cell supply chain (SCSC) is modeled in which domestic and foreign suppliers compete with each other on the efficiency influencing the final price of solar cells. Since the SCSC is in the developing stage, it needs to be supported by governments to encourage cooperation among the members of SCSC. One of the most common governmental supports for domestic suppliers is the assignment of subsidy to improve the SCSC's performance and its profit. This paper explores a two-echelon SCSC where three scenarios—including the presence of a domestic supplier in a monopoly market, the presence of a foreign rival in a competitive market, and government intervention in a competitive market—are investigated. In addition, the scenario considering the government intervention is analyzed under the non-cooperative Nash behavior (decentralized), centralized, and collaboration circumstances, the optimal values of which are discussed. SCSC members cooperate with each other through the collaboration condition. The objective function related to the government's role is defined as the main objective in order to calculate the optimal government tariffs, while the supply chain components obtain a profit more than the decentralized situation. This study has been examined using numerical examples, whose results show that the government intervention affects the price, efficiency, and members' profit. Finally, managerial insights are proposed and discussed to enhance the efficiency of the supply chain.
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