Informational interventions (e.g., awareness campaigns, carbon footprint calculators) are built on the assumption that informing the public about the environmental consequences of their actions should result in increased pro-environmental intentions and behavior. However, empirical support for this reasoning is mixed. In this paper, we argue that informational interventions may succeed in improving people’s knowledge about the negative environmental consequences of one’s actions, but this knowledge will not gain motivational force if people do not consider protecting the environment an important personal value. In an experiment, we measured individual differences in value priorities, and either presented participants a movie clip that portrayed the negative environmental consequences of using bottled water, or a control movie. As predicted, we found that the environmental movie improved recipients’ knowledge of the negative environmental impact of bottled water, but this knowledge only resulted in concomitant changes in intentions and acceptability of related policies among participants who strongly endorsed biospheric (i.e. environmental) values, while having no effect on those who care less about the environment. Interestingly, the results suggest that although informational interventions are perhaps not always successful in directly affecting less environmentally-conscious recipients, they could still have beneficial effects, because they make those who strongly care about the environment more inclined to act on their values.

The aim of this study is to better understand why public officials and business employees engage in corruption. Insight into individual-level explanations for corruption was obtained with the aid of a self-report survey. The results suggest that the most indicative factors of whether or not individuals are corruption-prone are as follows: the moral conviction they have to refrain from corruption; perceptions of whether their colleagues approve of and engage in corruption; and difficulties experienced in complying with the rules on corruption. This result pattern was identical for public officials and business employees alike, and as a consequence, for both sides of corrupt acts. The latter indicates that the same motives may not only underlie corruption in both private and public sectors, but also the act of corruption in its active and passive forms. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for the assumption that economic considerations-expected costs and benefits-are crucial in predicting corruption. Based on the findings that norms and the perceived opportunity to comply are dominant factors in explaining corruption, this article focuses on the practical implications for the development of anti-corruption strategies within both public and private sectors.

Eco-driving can be an effective strategy to save fuel and reduce CO2 emissions on the road. In the current study, we reason that personal norms are important predictors of eco-driving, and that they are activated when people are aware of environmental problems caused by behavior (problem awareness) and believe that they can contribute to the solution of the problem by changing behavior (outcome efficacy). Extending previous research, we aim at testing two antecedents of this norm activation process: values and environmental knowledge. Results revealed that in comparison with knowledge, values—in particular biospheric values—were strongly associated with the intention to eco-drive by being highly related to awareness of problems caused by car use, which in turn was associated with stronger outcome efficacy beliefs and personal norms for eco-driving. Findings indicate that values are more likely to be a motivational force for pro-environmental intentions than is environmental knowledge.

Abstract:The aim of this research was to examine how organizational and individual factors, in concert, shape corruption. We examined whether the ethical climate of organizations is related to corruption, and if so, whether it affects corruption through individual motives for corruption. A large-scale questionnaire study was conducted among public officials (n = 234) and business employees (n = 289) who were in a position to make corrupt decisions. The findings suggest that public and private sector employees who perceive their organizational climate as more egoistic and less ethical are more prone to corruption. This relationship was fully mediated by individual motives, specifically by personal and social norms on corruption. These results indicate that employees who perceive their organization's ethical climate as more egoistic and less ethical experience weaker personal and social norms to refrain from corruption, making them more corruption-prone. Hence, strategies addressing the interplay between organizational factors and individual motives seem promising in curbing corruption. To effectively withhold employees from engaging in corruption, organizations could deploy measures that strengthen an organizations' ethical climate and encourage ethical decision-making based on concern for the wellbeing of others, as well as measures increasing the strength of personal and social norms to refrain from corruption.

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The aim of this study was to gain an in-depth understanding of the factors that underlie public officials’ engagement in corruption. Given the significant public interest, we gained permission from the Dutch Ministry of Justice to analyze multiple confidential criminal files of cases in which Dutch public officials took bribes from private companies. Extending previous research, we analyzed three types of factors, individual factors, organizational factors, and factors related to the relationships between corrupt officials and their bribers. Moreover, for the first time, we considered the interplay between these three types of factors. The results suggest that public officials’ engagement in bribery is rooted in a combination of individual, organizational and relationship variables that influence and reinforce each other, creating a toxic mix. This implies that the battle against bribery can be fought on multiple fronts, whereby changing one critical factor may cause the mix to lose its toxicity.

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