Earlier research found that the mere sight of tears promotes the willingness to provide support to the person shedding the tears. Other research, however, found that deliberate responses towards tearful persons could be more negative as well. We think this is because tears have ambivalent effects on person perception: We predicted that tearful people are seen as warmer, but also as less competent. In three studies, we asked participants (total N = 1,042) to form their impression of someone based on a picture. The depicted person either displayed visible tears, or the tears had been digitally removed. Tearful individuals were perceived as being warmer, but also as less competent. In Study 2, we also added a measure of perceived sadness. Seeing a tearful face increased perceived sadness, and this (partially) explained the reduction in perceived competence of the target person. There was no such indirect effect of the tear on perceived warmth via perceived sadness. Study 3 found that people would be more likely to approach a tearful person to offer help than a tearless individual. At the same time, tearful individuals would be more likely to be avoided in situations in which the observer needs assistance for an important task.

We tested whether the perceived physical attractiveness of a group is greater than the average attractiveness of its members. In nine studies, we find evidence for the so-called group attractiveness effect (GA-effect), using female, male, and mixed-gender groups, indicating that group impressions of physical attractiveness are more positive than the average ratings of the group members. A meta-analysis on 33 comparisons reveals that the effect is medium to large (Cohen's d = 0.60) and moderated by group size. We explored two explanations for the GA-effect: (a) selective attention to attractive group members, and (b) the Gestalt principle of similarity. The results of our studies are in favor of the selective attention account: People selectively attend to the most attractive members of a group and their attractiveness has a greater influence on the evaluation of the group.

Many people who endorse gender equality do not personally identify as feminists. The present research offers a novel explanation for this disconnect by examining people’s attitudes toward feminist prototypes—the central, representative feminist that comes to mind when they think of feminists as a group. Results from two samples support the hypothesis that both implicit and explicit attitudes toward feminist prototypes predict unique variance in feminist identity beyond gender-equality attitudes. Results from a second study show feminist identity to mediate between implicit prototypes and self-reported willingness to engage in feminist behaviors. Lastly, a third study shows feminist identity to mediate between implicit prototypes and actual feminist behavior. This is the first study to specifically examine the role of implicit attitudes and prototype favorability in understanding feminist identity and behavior, and the results suggest that promoting positive prototypes of feminists may be an effective route to encouraging feminist identity.

Six studies test whether women who label themselves feminists are judged as warmer and less competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs but do not label themselves. An integrative data analysis shows that women who label themselves feminists are seen as less warm and more competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs but do not label themselves. This difference in evaluations is caused by the fact that women who label themselves feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who belief in gender equality but do not use the feminist label. This idea is confirmed by showing that women with strong feminist beliefs are seen as warmer and less competent than women with weak feminist beliefs. In summary, women who label themselves feminists are seen as warmer and less competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs, because it is inferred that the feminist labeler does not have the same, but stronger gender-equality beliefs.

Abstract. Four studies show that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior, if it is clever. Four studies found consistently that participants rated the behavior of a man who relied on attractiveness or passiveness (stereotypically female) to be more acceptable than similar behavior by a woman. The behavior of a woman who relied on dominance or aggressiveness (stereotypically male) was sometimes seen as more (Study 1A) and sometimes equally (Study 1B, Study 2, Study 3) acceptable as the behavior of a man who acted similarly. This shows that double standards might play a role: Whereas men are benefited by gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, this is not the case for women. Across studies, these effects were driven by the interpretation of the gender stereotype-inconsistent acts as more clever and less trashy than gender stereotype-consistent acts. These results qualify the idea that people dislike stereotype-inconsistency.

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