A model for the spread of an infection is analyzed for different population structures. The interactions within the population are described by small world networks, ranging from ordered lattices to random graphs. For the more ordered systems, there is a fluctuating endemic state of low infection. At a finite value of the disorder of the network, we find a transition to self-sustained oscillations in the size of the infected subpopulation.
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community.
We consider a model for population dynamics such as for the evolution of bacterial colonies which is of the Fisher type but where the competitive interaction among individuals is nonlocal, and show that spatial structures with interesting features emerge. These features depend on the nature of the competitive interaction as well as on its range, specifically on the presence or absence of tails in, and the central curvature of, the influence function of the interaction.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.