a b s t r a c tThe multiple detections of gravitational waves by LIGO (the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory), operated by Caltech and MIT, have been acclaimed as confirming Einstein's prediction, a century ago, that gravitational waves propagating as ripples in spacetime would be detected. Yunes and Pretorius (2009) investigate whether LIGO's template-based searches encode fundamental assumptions, especially the assumption that the background theory of general relativity is an accurate description of the phenomena detected in the search. They construct the parametrized post-Einsteinian (ppE) framework in response, which broadens those assumptions and allows for wider testing under more flexible assumptions. Their methods are consistent with work on confirmation and testing found in Carnap (1936), Hempel (1969), and Stein (1992, 1994, with the following principles in common: that confirmation is distinct from testing, and that, counterintuitively, revising a theory's formal basis can make it more broadly empirically testable. These views encourage a method according to which theories can be made abstract, to define families of general structures for the purpose of testing. With the development of the ppE framework and related approaches, multi-messenger astronomy is a catalyst for deep reasoning about the limits and potential of the theoretical framework of general relativity.
Ott (2009) identifies two kinds of philosophical theories about laws: top-down, and bottom-up. An influential top-down reading, exemplified by Ernst Cassirer, emphasized the 'mere form of law'. Recent bottom-up accounts emphasize the mind-independent natures of objects as the basis of laws of nature. Stang and Pollok in turn focus on the transcendental idealist elements of Kant's theory of matter, which leads to the question: is the essence of Kantian matter that it obeys the form of law? I argue that Kant has an independent theory of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, one that gives what Kant himself calls a "real definition" of matter as a theoryindependent (if not mind-independent) entity. I argue that this matter theory underpins physical arguments about inertia and impenetrability which resemble Einstein's arguments about the unification of fields in general relativity.
This chapter sifts through some of the most important intuitions and assumptions that have guided the debate over laws of nature since the concept’s invention in the seventeenth century. Competing positions on laws of nature are typically evaluated by their ability to satisfy various pre-theoretical desiderata. Laws, for example, are supposed to govern; they are supposed to explain; and they are supposed to allow predictions. But what do these desiderata really amount to? We argue that only by examining the provenance of these intuitions can we properly weigh them. Some of these requirements turn out to be artifacts of the origin and development of the concept of a law of nature. Progress can be made only if we take a critical approach toward our own intuitions, informed by the history of the debate over laws of nature.
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