This study aims to explore the motor insurance market's attitude towards usage-based insurance (UBI), and thus its readiness for a launch in the near future. Data on client perception was collected using a structured questionnaire. On the basis of this, an initial selection of factors, other than income, that could influence the declared attitude of drivers was demonstrated showing that it is primarily dependent on certain demographic characteristics like their age, sex, or place of residence. A strong relationship was also demonstrated with respect to the intensity of the vehicle's use, to the amount of the insurance premium they have paid, and to the self-assessment of the respondents' driving skills. Clients are likely to accept the concept of UBI once implemented, but that they are not ready yet to give up the traditionally used methods of premium calculation. Their attachment to discounts granted can be very strong in particular to the no-claims bonus.
The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the presence of self-selection mechanisms on the market that could bring the market closer to the separating equilibrium state, in line with the Rothschild–Stiglitz equilibrium model and its subsequent modifications. An example is the Polish market of compulsory third-party liability insurance of vehicle owners. This paper describes this market in terms of both its structure and its financial results. The main focus is on describing the assumptions of the Rothschild–Stiglitz model for markets operating under the conditions of information asymmetry and based on the self-selection mechanism, allowing for an unequivocal determination of the insured’s profile without the need to actually observe the insured’s behaviour. Finally, we show that thanks to the self-selection induced by the possibility of driving behaviour monitoring, the industry can minimise the negative effect information asymmetry has on the motor insurance market. This can be achieved, for example, by observing the choices made by the insured after being offered a new voluntary contract with a premium based on telematics data. Our analysis was carried out with the use of three selected characteristics that can determine the insured’s risk profile, i.e., distance covered, self-assessment, and insurance premium paid; the significance of the latter—although it may be intuitive—is questionable at commonly accepted significance levels. Therefore, the main result is that although there is some evidence on the disputed matter, there can be no definitive conclusion—especially in terms of risk as measured by insurance premium.
Celem artykułu jest weryfikacja możliwości redukcji negatywnego wpływu asymetrii informacji na rynek ubezpieczeń komunikacyjnych przez wdrożenie produktów typu Usage‑Based Insurance. Autor dokonuje analizy ekonomicznej, uzyskując przewidywania modeli rynku przy zastosowaniu trzech przykładowych strategii wdrożenia rozwiązań telematycznych. Wykazuje, że nie każdy ze scenariuszy doprowadzi do otrzymania pożądanego stanu równowagi i wyłącznie prawidłowy wybór strategii rynkowego wdrożenia rozwiązań telematycznych pozwoli ubezpieczonym z grupy niskiego ryzyka otrzymać pełną ochronę przy składce sprawiedliwej. Będzie to stanowić poprawę w sensie Pareto w porównaniu do ich położenia w warunkach występowania asymetrii informacji i może zostać osiągnięte przez wdrożenie produktów wykorzystujących dane z tzw. czarnych skrzynek lub urządzeń typu dongle.
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