Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Lukas Wenner, University College London Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. Terms of use: Documents inCopyright remains with the authors. AbstractExpected Prices as Reference Points -Theory and Experiments * I show theoretically that applying the model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) to a simple purchasing decision where consumers are ex-ante uncertain about the price realisation, gives -when changing the underlying distribution of expected prices -rise to counterintuitive predictions in contrast with a "good deal model" where consumers are predicted to be disappointed (rejoice) when the realised price is perceived as being worse (better) than the other possible realisation. While the underlying ideas of both models are similar with respect to expectation-based reference points, the different results come from the concept of Personal Equilibrium in Köszegi and Rabin (2006). The experimental results show some support for the simpler good deal model for a number of different real consumption goods though the support is weaker for goods that either have a salient market price or no market price outside of the experiment.
We investigate the presence and stability of dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment subjects make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves and another person. We find substantial time inconsistency in generosity: agents become disproportionally more selfish when decisions have immediate rather than delayed consequences. Based on our theoretical framework, structural estimations reveal that this is because agents exhibit present bias in own but not in others' consumption. We show that very similar differences in present bias are observed in the absence of any interpersonal trade-offs, when agents decide either for themselves or on behalf of another person. At the individual level, we find that present bias in own consumption is a stable behavioral trait which is correlated across individual and social contexts.
We investigate dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment, participants make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves and another person. Our results reveal that agents are present-biased when making choices that only affect themselves but not when choosing for others. Despite this asymmetry, we find no evidence for time-inconsistent generosity, i.e., when choices involve trade-offs between own and other's consumption. Structural estimations reveal no individual-level correlation of present bias across contexts. Discounting in social situations thus seems to be conceptually different from discounting in individual situations.
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice -and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005).
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