The COVID‐19 pandemic poses an exceptional challenge for humanity. Because public behaviour is key to curbing the pandemic at an early stage, it is important for social psychological researchers to use their knowledge to promote behaviours that help manage the crisis. Here, we identify human values as particularly important in driving both behavioural compliance to government guidelines and promoting prosocial behaviours to alleviate the strains arising from a prolonged pandemic. Existing evidence demonstrates the importance of human values, and the extent to which they are shared by fellow citizens, for tackling the COVID‐19 crisis. Individuals who attach higher importance to self‐transcendence (e.g., responsibility) and conservation (e.g., security) values are likely to be more compliant with COVID‐19 behavioural guidelines and to help others who are struggling with the crisis. Further, believing that fellow citizens share one's values has been found to elicit a sense of connectedness that may be crucial in promoting collective efforts to contain the pandemic. The abstract nature of values, and cross‐cultural agreement on their importance, suggests that they are ideally suited to developing and tailoring effective, global interventions to combat this pandemic.

The need for cognition refers to people’s tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking and has become influential across social and medical sciences. Using three samples from the United States and the United Kingdom ( N = 1,596), we introduce a six-item short version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS-18). First, we reduced the number of items from 18 to 6 based on the items’ discrimination values, threshold levels, measurement precision (item information curve), item–total correlations, and factor loadings. Second, we confirmed the one-factor structure and established measurement invariance across countries and gender. Finally, we demonstrated that while the NCS-6 provides significant time savings, it comes at a minimal cost in terms of its construct validity with external variables such as openness, cognitive reflection test, and need for affect. Overall, our findings indicate that the NCS-6 is a parsimonious, reliable, and valid measure of need for cognition.

Losses in biodiversity and trends toward urbanisation have reduced people’s contact with biodiverse nature, yet the consequences for mental well-being are not well understood. Here, we demonstrate that greater plant and animal species richness in isolation causes an improvement in mental well-being. To do so, the present research experimentally manipulated species richness and assessed widely-used indicators of mental well-being. Participants viewed short videos of either high or low tree (Study 1) or bird (Study 2) species richness and reported on positive (i.e., vitality, positive affect) and negative (i.e., anxiety) indicators of mental well-being. Building on Study 1, Study 2 included an urban environment as a reference treatment and explored the role of giving participants information on the presented environment. We find that, in line with expectations, watching videos containing greater species richness consistently leads to higher mental well-being. We discuss findings in light of the importance of connecting people to biodiverse environments.

Memory performance in linear order reasoning tasks (A > B, B > C, C > D, etc.) shows quicker, and more accurate responses to queries on wider (AD) than narrower (AB) pairs on a hypothetical linear mental model (A - B - C - D). While indicative of an analogue representation, research so far did not provide positive evidence for spatial processes in the construction of such models. In a series of 7 experiments we report such evidence. Participants respond quicker when the dominant element in a pair is presented on the left (or top) rather than on the right (or bottom). The left-anchoring tendency reverses in a sample with Farsi background (reading/writing from right to left). Alternative explanations and confounds are tested. A theoretical model is proposed that integrates basic assumptions about acquired reading/writing habits as a scaffold for spatial simulation, and primacy/dominance representation within such spatial simulations. (PsycINFO Database Record

Although human values and value dissimilarity play pivotal roles in the prejudice literature, there remain important gaps in our understanding. To address these gaps, we recruited three British samples (N=350) and presented Muslim immigrants, refugees, and economic migrants as target groups. Using polynomial regression analyses, we simultaneously tested effects of individuals' own values, their perceptions of immigrant values, and self-immigrant value dissimilarities on prejudice. Results indicated that favorability toward immigrants is higher when individuals hold higher self-transcendence values (e.g., equality) and lower selfenhancement values (e.g., power), and when they perceive immigrants to hold higher selftranscendence values and lower self-enhancement values. In addition, prejudice toward immigrants is higher when individuals who hold higher conservation values (e.g., security) perceive immigrants to value openness (e.g., freedom) more, suggesting a value dissimilarity effect. No value dissimilarity effects emerged when immigrants were perceived to be higher in conservation, self-transcendence, or self-enhancement values. Overall, these results showed that effects of values and value dissimilarity differ depending on which value dimension is considered. Additionally, the results revealed support for a novel mechanism with the motivation to be non-prejudiced underpinning the links between individuals' values and prejudice. Our discussion highlights the multifaceted manner in which values are linked to prejudice.

People often make inferences about the values of other people in their families, cities, and countries, but there are reasons to expect systematic biases in these inferences. Across four studies (N = 1,763), we examined people’s perceptions of the values of their families, fellow citizens of the cities in which they live, and compatriots across three nations (Brazil, Germany, the United Kingdom). Our results show that people systematically misperceive comparison groups’ values. People underestimate the importance that their compatriots ascribe to more important values and overestimate the importance of less important values. This occurs in comparison with their own values, the actual values of the people living in the same city and the actual values of their compatriots. The effect sizes were medium to large. Furthermore, the results occurred independently of participants’ culture, time spent in the culture, and the underlying value model used. These results consistently show that people’s speculations about values in their community and society are biased in a self- and family favoring direction. In addition, we found that the structure of values (e.g., as proposed by Schwartz) holds for perceived family, fellow citizens of the cities in which they live, and compatriots’ values. Overall, our findings suggest that the values of other people are more selfless than is often believed.

Three studies explored the connection between social perception processes and individual differences in the use of affective and cognitive information in relation to attitudes. Study 1 revealed that individuals high in need for affect (NFA) accentuated differences in evaluations of warm and cold traits, whereas individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) accentuated differences in evaluations of competent and incompetent traits. Study 2 revealed that individual differences in NFA predicted liking of warm or cold targets, whereas individual differences in NFC predicted perceptions of competent or incompetent targets. Furthermore, the effects of NFA and NFC were independent of structural bases and meta-bases of attitudes. Study 3 revealed that differences in the evaluation of warm and cold traits mediated the effects of NFA and NFC on liking of targets. The implications for social perception processes and for individual differences in affect-cognition are discussed.

It is often assumed that incongruence between individuals’ values and those of their country is distressing, but the evidence has been mixed. Across 29 countries, the present research investigated whether well-being is higher if people’s values match with those of people living in the same country or region. Using representative samples, we find that person-country and person-region value congruence predict six well-being measures (e.g., emotional well-being, relationship support; N = 54,673). Crucially, however, value type moderates whether person-country fit is positively or negatively associated with well-being. People who value self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism more and live in countries and regions where people on average share these values report lower well-being. In contrast, people who value achievement, power, and security more and live in countries and regions where people on average share these values, report higher well-being. Additionally, we find that people who moderately value stimulation report the highest well-being.