Research suggests that conspiracy beliefs are adopted because they promise to reduce anxiety, uncertainty, and threat. However, little research has investigated whether conspiracy beliefs actually fulfill these promises. We conducted two longitudinal studies ( NStudy 1 = 405, NStudy 2 = 1,012) to examine how conspiracy beliefs result from, and in turn influence, anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat. Random intercept cross-lagged panel analyses indicate that people who were, on average, more anxious, uncertainty averse, and existentially threatened held stronger conspiracy beliefs. Increases in conspiracy beliefs were either unrelated to changes in anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat (Study 2), or even predicted increases in these variables (Study 1). In both studies, increases in conspiracy beliefs predicted subsequent increases in conspiracy beliefs, suggesting a self-reinforcing circle. We conclude that conspiracy beliefs likely do not have beneficial consequences, but may even reinforce the negative experience of anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat.

During the coronavirus pandemic, governments across the globe ordered physicaldistancing and hygiene restrictions to slow down the spread of COVID-19. The present work was conducted during the peak of restrictions in Germany (April/May 2020). In a convenient (N = 218) and representative sample (N = 715), we examined people's motivations to comply with these restrictions during the lockdown: Were they motivated by personal self-protection, or rather by solidarity with people in risk groups? Specifically, we investigated predictors of personal self-protection (compliance to protect the self against infection) and group-protection behaviours (compliance for reasons of solidarity in protecting people in risk groups). Results indicate that self-and group-protection result from different psychological processes: Whereas personal self-protection seems to be a form of coping with personal anxieties (epistemic and existential needs, personal threat), group protection is an intergroup phenomenon that is enabled by identification with a collective goal (common identity), the perception that society is capable of dealing with the virus (group efficacy), and concern for people in risk groups. We discuss potential implications for behavioural change in pandemics.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

Traditional definitions of political ideology state that right-wingers support system stability, whereas left-wingers support social change. However, during the last decade many right-wing movements have been on the rise and demanded far-reaching changes. We argue that both left-, and right-wing protestors reject the status quo, and are motivated to change it -albeit in opposing directions: either to increase equality (progressive social change), or inequality (reactionary social change). In two studies (N Study1 = 453, N Study2 = 614), both left-, and right-wingers scored lower on system justification than moderates. Further, latent profile analyses showed that supporters of progressive social change were characterized by low system justification and left-wing ideology, whereas supporters of reactionary social change were characterized by low system justification and right-wing ideology. This indicates that right-wingers do not necessarily support system stability -instead, they reject the status quo and promote change in the direction of greater inequality.

To reduce the spread of COVID-19, adherence to protective measures was crucial around the world. While most complied with these measures, a vocal minority protested against them. Early reports emphasized the unusual heterogeneity of these protests: Hippies and esoterics marched alongside conspiracy theorists and neo-Nazis. We examined what these protestors might (and might not) have in common. A large study with antilockdown protestors in Germany ( N = 1,700) revealed four subgroups: centrists, politically undifferentiated, left-wingers, and right-wingers. Beyond that, these subgroups demonstrated striking similarities: All endorsed conspiracy beliefs, misinformation, esotericism, and vaccine hesitancy to a similar extent. These beliefs share that they are scientifically unfounded and epistemically unwarranted. They may unite individuals from diverse political backgrounds in the antilockdown protests.

This preregistered research analyzed survey data from ethnic and religious advantaged groups in 12 countries ( N = 2,304) to examine the interplay between two determinants of support for social change toward intergroup equality. Drawing on the needs-based model and the common-ingroup identity model, we hypothesized that the experience of accepting intergroup contact and the endorsement of a dual identity representation of intergroup relations would be associated with greater support for equality. Furthermore, integrating the logic of both models, we tested the novel hypothesis that the positive effect of accepting contact on support for equality would be stronger under a high (vs. low) dual identity representation. While the predicted main effects received empirical support, we found no evidence for the expected interaction. These findings suggest that interventions to foster support for social change among advantaged group members can promote accepting contact and a dual identity representation independently of each other.