This paper challenges the prevalent notion that family-owned firms are more risk averse than publicly owned firms. Using behavioral theory, we argue that for family firms, the primary reference point is the loss of their socioemotional wealth, and to avoid those losses, family firms are willing to accept a significant risk to their performance; yet at the same time, they avoid risky business decisions that might aggravate that risk. Thus, we propose that the predictions of behavioral theory differ depending on family ownership. We confirm our hypotheses using a population of 1,237 family-owned olive oil mills in Southern Spain who faced the choice during a 54-year period of becoming a member of a cooperative, a decision associated with loss of family control but lower business risk, or remaining independent, which preserves the family's socioemotional wealth but greatly increases its performance hazard. As shown in this study, family firms may be risk willing and risk averse at the same time.

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This paper compares the environmental performance of family and nonfamily public corporations between 1998 and 2002, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms required to report their emissions. We found that family-controlled public firms protect their socioemotional wealth by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly at the local level, and that for the nonfamily firms, stock ownership by the chief executive officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact. We also found that the positive effect of family ownership on environmental performance persists independently of whether the CEO is a family member or serves both as CEO and board chair.

This study examines diversification decisions of family firms and suggests that on average family firms diversify less both domestically and internationally than non-family firms. When they do diversify, family firms tend to opt for domestic rather than international diversification, and those that go the latter route prefer to choose regions that are 'culturally close'. Lastly, we find that family firms are more willing to diversify as business risk increases. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 360 firms, 160 of them being family-controlled and the rest (200) non-family-controlled. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies.