We use a simulation performed within the Constrained Local Universe Simulation (CLUES) project to study a realistic Local Group (LG)‐like object. We employ this group as a numerical laboratory for studying the evolution of the population of its subhaloes from the point of view of the effects it may have on the origin of different types of dwarf galaxies. We focus on the processes of tidal stripping of the satellites, their interaction, merging and grouping before infall. The tidal stripping manifests itself in the transition between the phase of mass accretion and mass loss seen in most subhaloes, which occurs at the moment of infall on to the host halo, and the change of the shape of their mass function with redshift. Although the satellites often form groups, they are loosely bound within them and do not interact with each other. The infall of a large group could however explain the observed peculiar distribution of the LG satellites, but only if it occurred recently. Mergers between prospective subhaloes are significant only during an early stage of evolution, i.e. more than 7 Gyr ago, when they are still outside the host haloes. Such events could thus contribute to the formation of more distant early‐type Milky Way companions. Once the subhaloes enter the host halo the mergers become very rare.

Humans routinely use conditionally cooperative strategies when interacting in repeated social dilemmas. They are more likely to cooperate if others cooperated before, and are ready to retaliate if others defected. To capture the emergence of reciprocity, most previous models consider subjects who can only choose from a restricted set of representative strategies, or who react to the outcome of the very last round only. As players memorize more rounds, the dimension of the strategy space increases exponentially. This increasing computational complexity renders simulations for individuals with higher cognitive abilities infeasible, especially if multiplayer interactions are taken into account. Here, we take an axiomatic approach instead. We propose several properties that a robust cooperative strategy for a repeated multiplayer dilemma should have. These properties naturally lead to a unique class of cooperative strategies, which contains the classical Win-Stay Lose-Shift rule as a special case. A comprehensive numerical analysis for the prisoner's dilemma and for the public goods game suggests that strategies of this class readily evolve across various memory- spaces. Our results reveal that successful strategies depend not only on how cooperative others were in the past but also on the respective context of cooperation.

This article has been accepted for publication in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society © 2010 RAS © 2010 The Authors Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. All rights reserved.We study the differences and similarities in the luminosities of bound, infalling and the so-called backsplash galaxies of the Milky Way and M31 using a hydrodynamical simulation performed within the Constrained Local UniversE Simulation (CLUES) project. The simulation models the formation of the Local Group within a self-consistent cosmological framework. We find that even though backsplash galaxies passed through the virial radius of their host halo and hence may have lost a (significant) fraction of their mass, their stellar populations are hardly affected. This leaves us with comparable luminosity functions for infalling and backsplash galaxies and hence little hope to decipher their past (and different) formation and evolutionary histories by luminosity measurements alone. Nevertheless, due to the tidal stripping of dark matter we find that the mass-to-light ratios have changed when comparing the various populations against each other: they are highest for the infalling galaxies and lowest for the bound satellites with the backsplash galaxies in betweenAK is supported by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN) in Spain through the Ramón y Cajal programme and further acknowledges support by the Ministerio de Education (MEC) grant AYA 2009-13875- C03-02. SRK acknowledges support by the MICINN too under the Consolider-Ingenio, SyeC project CSD- 2007 -00050.We acknowledge support of MICINN through the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 Programme under grant MULTIDARK CSD2009-00064. GYacknowledges financial support from MEC (Spain) under project AYA 2009-13875- C03-02 and the ASTROMADRID project financed by Comunidad de Madri

Making agreements on how to behave has been shown to be an evolutionarily viable strategy in one-shot social dilemmas. However, in many situations agreements aim to establish long-term mutually beneficial interactions. Our analytical and numerical results reveal for the first time under which conditions revenge, apology and forgiveness can evolve and deal with mistakes within ongoing agreements in the context of the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. We show that, when the agreement fails, participants prefer to take revenge by defecting in the subsisting encounters. Incorporating costly apology and forgiveness reveals that, even when mistakes are frequent, there exists a sincerity threshold for which mistakes will not lead to the destruction of the agreement, inducing even higher levels of cooperation. In short, even when to err is human, revenge, apology and forgiveness are evolutionarily viable strategies which play an important role in inducing cooperation in repeated dilemmas.