In the aftermath of World War II, several influences were paramount in forcing academic psychology to recognize, albeit reluctantly, the coming professionalization of psychology. The federal government, wishing to avoid a repeat of blunders following World War I that led to significant dissatisfaction among veterans, took proactive steps to ensure that mental health needs of the new veterans would be met. The USPHS and the VA were mandated to expand significantly the pool of mental health practitioners, a direction that led not only to the funding of the Boulder conference but also to the development of APA's accreditation program, funded practical and internship arrangements with the VA, and the USPHS grants to academic departments for clinical training. The GI Bill, amended to include payment for graduate education, created tremendous interest in graduate programs in psychology. As a result, psychology programs were inundated with funded applicants, most of whom were interested in the application of psychology to clinical and other applied fields. Graduate psychology departments were mixed in their views of this "blessing." The reality of a separate curriculum for professional training in psychology was a bitter pill for some academic psychologists to swallow. Graduate departments feared that control of their programs would be taken over by external forces and that they would lose their right to determine their own curriculum. Further, they feared the domination of clinical training within their own departments and the effects of such educational emphasis on their traditional experimental programs. The Boulder conference brought together these disparate needs and concerns, although one can argue about how well some points of view were represented with respect to others. It was a time of high anticipation and fear. The conference could easily have ended in failure, with such diverse interests being unable to reach any consensus. There are many letters in the correspondence of committee members that suggest disagreements serious enough to prevent the development of any single model of training. Instead, by most yardsticks that one could apply, the conference succeeded, perhaps beyond the dreams of many of those in attendance who were most invested in a model for professional training. In evaluating the legacy of Boulder, several points are apparent. First, the conference succeeded because 73 individuals were able to agree to some 70 resolutions in 15 days, creating the scientist-practitioner model of professional training. Such consensus was arguably a remarkable achievement. The endorsement of the model by academic units followed with little evident resistance, although it is clear that some Boulder-model programs were developed that bore little resemblance to the model's insistence on significant training in both research and practice. Second, as a response to social and political needs, the conference was clearly a success. The cooperation of the APA, the USPHS, and the VA benefited all three entities. Clinica...

Although discussions of a core curriculum in doctoral training in psychology can be heard in contemporary psychology, there is no such common core, nor has one ever existed in American psychology's history. Advocates of a core curriculum argue that it ensures breadth of training, an outcome made even more important by growing specialization in psychology, and that it provides psychologists with a needed common identity as members of a recognized professional discipline. Opponents argue that a core curriculum places unwanted constraints on a program of study, prohibiting the kind of diversity needed to keep abreast of changes in psychology and related fields of study. The author reviews the history of this struggle within American psychology and discusses its implications for the science and practice of psychology.

The common advice to not change answers appears to be a mistake, but before that is certain, additional information is needed.Since 1928, at least 33 studies have been published concerning a number of issues surrounding answer-changing behavior on objective tests. Although results in these studies have sometimes been at variance, the one consistent finding is that there is nothing inherently wrong with changing initial answers on objective tests. In fact, the evidence uniformly indicates that: (a) the majority of answer changes are from incorrect to correct and (b) most students who change their answers improve their test scores. None of the 33 studies contradicts either of those conclusions.Most of the research in this area has been aimed at testing the accuracy of "first impressions" in test-taking. This bit of academic folk wisdom is typically stated as the belief that one should not change answers on objective tests because initial reactions to test questions are intuitively more accurate than subsequent responses.Prevalence of the Belief and Potential Sources. That this belief is widespread among test-takers is supported by a number of studies. Surveys of students' attitudes toward the results of answer changing are fairly consistent in their outcomes revealing that most students (between 68% and 100%) do not expect changed answers to improve their score. Indeed, approximately three out of every four of these students felt answer changes would lower their score. The percentages of students reporting an expected improvement have ranged from 0%

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