Can the netting of on-balance-sheet interbank assets and liabilities be useful in thwarting financial contagion during a systemic crisis episode? In order to answer this question, in this paper we use mean-field approximation techniques and computer simulations to comparatively assess how contagion spreads out throughout an interbank network under different settlement modes. We find that a regulator forcing banks to net their credit/debt obligations instead of allowing them to regulate their mutual exposures on a gross basis succeeds in reducing the number of defaults and in preserving the aggregate amount of bank capital. Interbank netting takes its toll on retail depositors by increasing their potential losses, however. Hence, our analysis provides support for an optimal crisis-management policy mix that combines the enforcement of bilateral netting with a blanket deposit insurance scheme. The desirability of netting increases when the system is highly connected and susceptible to large shocks, especially when strains are first detected in banks located at the core of the network.We would like to thank, without implications, the participants to the 22nd Annual Workshop on Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents and two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks and suggestions. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Italy.

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Persistently low inflation rates in the Euro Area raise the question whether inflation is still credibly anchored to the Euro-system's medium term target of below, but close to 2%. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate why agents' expectations that over the business cycle inflation will remain in line with the target begin to falter. Our hypothesis is that agents form expectations in terms of their confidence in the "normal regime", which is updated observing the state of the economy. Second, we study how the de-anchoring of expectations interacts with monetary policy determining whether the central bank is still able to achieve its target-and hence re-anchor inflation expectations-or whether the system drifts away towards depressed states of low inflation and output. Two are our main findings. The first is that, facing unfavourable shocks, if inflation expectations "fall faster" than the policy rate, and the zero lower bound is reached without correcting the shock, the system converges to a new steady state-the "new normal"-with permanent negative gaps. The second is that a more aggressive monetary policy is ineffective both at the ZLB and above the ZLB, when the shock is large and/or when the reactivity of inflation expectations is high enough. This last finding seems to support the necessity, in those conditions, to abandon conventional monetary policy and to switch to an aggressive reflationary policy that prevents the entrenchment of deflationary expectations.

Stablecoins are second generation cryptocurrencies, aimed at maintaining their value stable with respect to official currencies. The most famous example is perhaps represented by libra, the cryptocurrency announced by Facebook in 2019 and yet to be issued; the most widespread is tether, with a market capitalization of almost 10 billion dollars and a daily transaction volume of almost 50 billion dollars, which makes it the most used cryptocurrency. The diffusion of stablecoins is hardly surprising. By minimizing volatility – the main flaw of first generation cryptocurrencies, including bitcoin –, stablecoins are expected to play an even more important role on a global scale within a few years. Our contribution deals not with the economic, but specifically with the geopolitical factors that could foster the use of stablecoins for strategic and military purposes. In particular, we focus on how such payment instruments, together with other alternative electronic payment systems, could be used as a means to circumvent economic sanctions and ultimately as a challenge to the hegemony of the US dollar in the international monetary system.

Persistently low inflation rates in the Euro Area raise the question whether inflation is still credibly anchored to the Euro-system's medium term target of below, but close to 2%. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate why agents' expectations that over the business cycle inflation will remain in line with the target begin to falter. Our hypothesis is that agents form expectations in terms of their confidence in the "normal regime", which is updated observing the state of the economy. Second, we study how the de-anchoring of expectations interacts with monetary policy determining whether the central bank is still able to achieve its target-and hence re-anchor inflation expectations-or whether the system drifts away towards depressed states of low inflation and output. Two are our main findings. The first is that, facing unfavourable shocks, if inflation expectations "fall faster" than the policy rate, and the zero lower bound is reached without correcting the shock, the system converges to a new steady state-the "new normal"-with permanent negative gaps. The second is that a more aggressive monetary policy is ineffective both at the ZLB and above the ZLB, when the shock is large and/or when the reactivity of inflation expectations is high enough. This last finding seems to support the necessity, in those conditions, to abandon conventional monetary policy and to switch to an aggressive reflationary policy that prevents the entrenchment of deflationary expectations.

The Covid-19 crisis has radically changed the game for world and EU-economies, and urged for a reappraisal of the guidelines for a healthy management of public expenditure. This requires a deep rethinking of the role of public debt in modern capitalistic economies and of efficient, equitable and politically viable ways of financing it. This paper outlines the main operating framework of a Debt Agency tasked with the management of the Eurozone sovereign debts and the creation of a truly European safe asset. The framework leverages on the potential irredeemable nature of sovereign debts in order to build a common bond. By structurally filtering liquidity risk, the Debt Agency can price the Member States’ funding costs by referring only to their credit risk, as defined by EU agreed rules. The common bond issued by the Debt Agency thus avoids mutualisation by design; hence, it can be directly bought by the ECB. Due to its structural intertemporal sustainability, the Debt Agency’s framework delineated in this paper can serve as a benchmark for institutional and political decisions. In this perspective, a counterfactual exercise has been conducted in order to evaluate the future potential impact of the Debt Agency as well as the past distortions in market pricing of Member States’ fundamental risk due to market mispricing of the liquidity risk.

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