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This paper introduces a methodology to estimate the re-use of collateral based on actual transaction data. With a comprehensive data set from the Swiss franc repo market we are able to provide the first systematic study on the re-use of collateral. We find that re-using collateral was most popular prior to the financial crisis when roughly 10% of the outstanding interbank volume was secured with re-used collateral. Furthermore, we show that the re-use of collateral increases with the scarcity of collateral. By giving an estimate of the collateral re-use and explaining its drivers, the paper contributes to the on-going debate on collateral availability.JEL codes: D47, E58, G01, G18, G21, G32

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This paper analyses the determinants of firm participation in the Swiss COVID-19 loan programme, which aims to bridge firms’ liquidity shortfalls that have resulted from the pandemic. State-guaranteed COVID-19 loans are widely used by Swiss firms, with 20% of all firms participating, resulting in a sizeable programme of 2.4% of GDP. We use a comprehensive dataset to study the determinants of firm participation. Our results can be summarised as follows. First, participation was largely driven by the exposure of a firm to lockdown restrictions and to the intensity of the virus in the specific region. Second, we show that firms associated with lower liquidity ratios had a significantly higher probability of participating in the programme. Third, we find no clear evidence that firm indebtedness affected participation in the programme and no evidence that pre-existing potential “zombie firms” participated more strongly in the loan programme. Fourth, we show that the programme reached younger and smaller firms, which could be financially more vulnerable as they are less likely to obtain outside finance during a crisis. Overall, we conclude that given its objective, the programme appears to be successful.

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This paper sheds light on Swiss franc LIBOR futures, which are often used to derive interest rate expectations. We show that the differences between LIBOR futures and realized rates (excess returns) are, on average, positive over the last 25 years. Using interest rate surveys, we decompose excess returns into a (forward) term premium and forecast errors. The decomposition reveals that the bulk of excess returns arises from forecast errors, while the term premium is, on average, zero but time varying. We find that the term premium positively correlates with the business cycle, interest rate developments, and in absolute values increases with interest rate uncertainty.

The recent financial crisis has shown that many financial institutions may be systemically relevant. Their bankruptcy would cause significant costs for the overall economy. However, a clear definition of systemic risks still does not exist. Thus, the decision, whether an institution is, or is not systemically relevant is in the end made by policy makers. This paper takes a closer look at the incentives available to policy makers and their influence on the bailout decision. In the model presented here it is possible to show, that too many financial institutions get bailed out, when assuming that policy makers tend to be more risk-averse than socially optimal. The costs due to this misallocation of resources can be significant.