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This paper surveys the last two and a half decades of non‐neoclassical literature on endogenous technical change and the functional income distribution. We distinguish between classical‐Marxian and post‐Keynesian models, and analyze them under three different assumptions on the determinants of technical change: capital accumulation, income distribution, and labor market tightness. The balanced growth implications of alternative models are compared with neoclassical exogenous and endogenous growth theories. Despite the strong differences in the assumptions regarding the substitutability between capital and labor, the role of different classes in society, and whether or not productive factors are fully employed, the various alternative models can be classified in a way that highlights remarkable similarities with their neoclassical counterparts. Both neoclassical and alternative theories of endogenous growth: (i) have shown that long‐run growth is sensitive to investment decisions, and (ii) rely on a linear spillover from the stock of knowledge to the production of innovations. The comparison highlights the different channels emphasized by competing theories: saving behavior and market structure in the neoclassical theories, as opposed to income distribution, the state of the labor market, and investors' behavior in alternative theories.

In this paper, we introduce endogenous technological change through R&D expenditure on labor-augmenting innovation in the cyclical growth model by Goodwin (Goodwin, R. 1967. “A Growth Cycle.” In Socialism, Capitalism, and Economic Growth, edited by Carl Feinstein, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.). Innovation is a costly, forward-looking process financed out of profits, and pursued by owners of capital stock (capitalists) in order to foster labor productivity and save on labor requirements. Our main findings are: (i) Goodwin-type distributive cycles arise even with dynamic optimization, but (ii) endogenous technical change has a dampening effect on economic fluctuations; (iii) steady state per capita growth, income distribution and employment rate are endogenous, and depend on the capitalists’ discount rate, the institutional variables regulating the labor market, and policy variables such as subsidies to R&D activity. Implementing the model numerically to match long run data for the US, we show that: (iv) an increase in the capitalists’ discount rate lowers per-capita growth, the employment rate and the labor share; (v) an increase in workers’ bargaining strength moderately raises the labor share and moderately decreases per-capita growth, while sharply reducing employment: quarterly US fluctuations (1948–2006) in employment and the labor share seem to support this result; (vi) a balanced budget increase in the R&D subsidy also fosters per-capita growth at the expenses of the labor share, even though the corresponding variations might be small

This paper studies the dynamics of wealth distribution between workers and capitalists in a\ud neoclassical growth model with differential saving rates. It shows that if capitalists are thriftier than\ud workers and the factors elasticity of substitution is high enough to ensure endogenous growth,\ud capitalists share of total wealth asymptotically tends to one. It is also proved that a tax on capital\ud income shifts the long run distribution of wealth in workers favor, and that the capitalists share of\ud total wealth is a decreasing function of the tax rate. The results of the paper are compared to Pikettys\ud fundamental laws of capitalism