Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to enhance the understanding about how energy supply chains work to build resilience against exogenous security threats and thereafter what support mechanisms should be introduced or improved by the European Union. Design/methodology/approach – Five case studies and data collection from multiple sources is used to understand what exogenous security threats could lead to the disruption of oil and gas flows to Europe, how energy companies, from a supply chain perspective, are working to manage these threats and finally, how the EU may coordinate the security of the energy sector in collaboration with supply chain companies. Findings – Results show that today, oil and gas supply chains have in place a good combination of disruption strategies, including portfolio diversification, flexible contracts, transport capacity planning and safety stocks. The most relevant security threats the companies fear, include hijacking of vessels (sea piracy), but also terrorism, and wars. Finally, the study highlights that the European Union has built a comprehensive portfolio of strategies to deal with scarcity of oil and gas resources. However, these approaches are not often synchronized with supply chain strategies. Practical implications – The paper provides guidance for supply chain managers dealing with critical suppliers located in conflict environments. The paper recommends that supply chain managers fine tune their strategies in coordination with governmental actions in foreign politics, dependence reduction and crisis management. This may be achieved by closer communication with governments and potentially through the creation of a pan-European sector alliance. Originality/value – Previous research discusses the topic of supply chain resilience and supply chain risk management. However, none of these studies report on exogenous security threats and disruption strategies of oil and gas supply chains. At the same time, previous research lacks detailed studies describing the interaction between governments and energy supply chains.

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This is the accepted version of a paper published in. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination.

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Statistics show that large amounts of goods moved in distribution chains incur the risk for being stolen, counterfeited or contaminated. At the same time terror threats for smuggling weapons of mass destructions, or intentionally altering products, are pushing governments to require higher security from logistics and transport operators. As a consequence, supply chain managers have to face the difficult task of choosing among extensive sets of security solutions to protect their distribution networks. Many and conflicting analyses can be found in available scientific literature. Therefore this paper provides with an overview of available security solutions so as a framework to identify weak spots and related countermeasures in distribution chains. Moreover recommendations for managers and future research are put forward. A combination of methods is adopted: a literature search, a survey to collect security solutions, structured interviews, and collection and classification of the findings.

Abstract:The same Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) that have contributed tremendously to the productivity of supply chain companies and governments alike, as well as to the global competitiveness of the European Union, expose modern societies to a range of cyber threats. ICT systems are fundamental to ensure that undisrupted flows of merchandise and critical supplies, such as oil, minerals, rare earths, pharmaceuticals and food are moved in and out of the EU territory. Past events have revealed the vulnerability of global supply chains to crime and terrorism. However, previous research does not highlight how these threats may be affected with the support of cyber attacks. Hence, by means of a literature review and experts' validation, this study develops a set of three scenarios that outline how cybercrime could jeopardize security of supply chains and, consequently, the wellbeing of European citizens. Finally, implications for managers and EU agencies are discussed.

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Purpose – Supply chain stakeholders may perceive security risks differently and thereby misalign mitigation strategies. Hence, causing weak spots in supply chains and thereby disruptions. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether supply chain companies actually perceive security risks and effectiveness of mitigation strategies differently. Design/methodology/approach – Two survey studies measuring perception of security risks and effectiveness of measures have been developed and used to collect data from European and Latin American companies, grouped as cargo owners and logistics companies. Findings – The findings of the surveys unveil that only two (out of six) security risks, namely, violation of customs non-fiscal regulations and illegal immigration, show significant differences between the two groups of companies. In addition, the surveys show that companies perceive equally the effectiveness of security measures. This study concludes that supply chains seem to have good visibility over the security risks of their partners. Hence, in terms of security, supply chain companies seem to have achieved a common understanding of risks and furthermore are able to act jointly to secure assets and operations. Originality/value – Previous research claim supply chain stakeholders may perceive risks differently and thereby may fail to correctly align mitigation strategies. Yet, to the authors knowledge, previous research has not empirically demonstrated these differences in perceptions of risks and mitigation strategies.