People who are members of a group, and identify with it, behave differently from people in isolation. The way in which the behavior differs depends in subtle ways from the way in which the nature of the group is perceived, as well as its salience, and also on the way in which people perceive that group membership and observation affects the behavior of others.We study these hypotheses in a strategic experimental environment. Participants are allocated randomly to two groups (Row and Column players), and a room is assigned to each group. The salience of the group membership is manipulated by making the group present as an audience in the corresponding room, or not. We use two stage games, the Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma.We show that the salience of the group affects behavior of members, as well as the behavior of people in the other group, and that participants anticipate these effects. Group membership increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in the audience). The effect on the outcomes of this increased aggressive stance depends on the game: In the Battle of the Sexes, the aggressiveness of hosts leads to coordination on an efficient, alternating outcome; in the Prisoner's Dilemma, it leads to conflict and inefficient outcomes.
People who are members of a group, and identify with it, behave differently from people in isolation. The way in which the behavior differs depends in subtle ways from the way in which the nature of the group is perceived, as well as its salience, and also on the way in which people perceive that group membership and observation affects the behavior of others.We study these hypotheses in a strategic experimental environment. Participants are allocated randomly to two groups (Row and Column players), and a room is assigned to each group. The salience of the group membership is manipulated by making the group present as an audience in the corresponding room, or not. We use two stage games, the Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma.We show that the salience of the group affects behavior of members, as well as the behavior of people in the other group, and that participants anticipate these effects. Group membership increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in the audience). The effect on the outcomes of this increased aggressive stance depends on the game: In the Battle of the Sexes, the aggressiveness of hosts leads to coordination on an efficient, alternating outcome; in the Prisoner's Dilemma, it leads to conflict and inefficient outcomes.
This paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over state-contingent consumption bundles, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space. A bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set. When preferences are complete this set is a singleton, and the model reduces to standard expected utility. In this setting, we characterize Pareto optima and equilibria, and show that the presence of uncertainty generates robust indeterminacies in equilibrium prices and allocations for any specification of initial endowments. We derive comparative statics results linking the degree of uncertainty with changes in equilibria. Despite the presence of robust indeterminacies, we show that equilibrium prices and allocations vary continuously with underlying fundamentals. Equilibria in a standard risk economy are thus robust to adding small degrees of uncertainty. Finally, we give conditions under which some assets are not traded due to uncertainty aversion. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with đź’™ for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.