In the field of global rule-setting for responsible business behaviour, multi-stakeholder standards have emerged in recent years because of their potential for effective consensus-building, knowledge-sharing and interest representation. Proponents also hold that multi-stakeholder standards could address problems related to other forms of global rule-setting for business. Despite alleged advantages, however, analyses of multi-stakeholder initiatives, considering benefits and drawbacks, have been lacking. This article examines multi-stakeholder standards compared to other collaborative standards adopted in the past decade, and focuses subsequently on the peculiarities of multi-stakeholder standards regarding participation, governance and implementation. Multi-stakeholder standards, which involve business and NGOs, and sometimes also governments, are more specific and well-elaborated than other types of standards. But monitoring and implementation are rarely used as means for increasing participation from multiple stakeholders, including most notably those from developing countries. The article also discusses the implications of the current lack of specificity of the (multi-)stakeholder concept and suggests refinement of multi-stakeholder standards in terms of narrow versus broad inclusiveness.

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Voluntary governance arrangements focusing on responsible business behavior have proliferated over the past decades, and in many sectors of industry, different governance organizations now compete for business participation. This private governance competition has negative consequences for the effective functioning of these arrangements. In the literature up until now, optimism prevails on how a process of policy convergence between organizations may come about that would solve some of the problems that arise because of this competition. It is remarkable, however, that in one of the key industries referred to in this literature, the garments industry, convergence is virtually absent. This article explains why this is so and suggests that next to three existing approaches to the evolution and possible convergence of private governance organizations, actually a fourth, pessimistic type should be introduced, taking into account the evolution and perseverance of political difference between interest groups creating and supporting private governance arrangements.

In order to address challenges resulting from interactions between transnational private sustainability standard organizations, initiatives emerge that meta-govern these standards. Contrary to prevailing understandings in public policy literature, such metagovernance initiatives are mostly run by nongovernmental rather than governmental actors. While literature presents the sustainability standards field as predominantly governed by one meta-governor, ISEAL, it is hardly recognized that, alongside ISEAL, rival metagovernance initiatives are proliferating. These initiatives occur in similar sectors and issue fields, use quite similar modes of meta-governance and interact with each other. This paper explains the multiple emergence of meta-governance in the governance of sustainability standards in agriculture. It shows how meta-governance efforts are developed by political coalitions of nongovernmental actors with divergent views on and priorities in making production more sustainable. It therefore reveals the mechanism through which metagovernance of coordination problems among cross-border self-organizing governance arrangements may end up reproducing these coordination problems, rather than addressing them.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the multiplicity of corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards, explaining its nature, dynamics and implications for multinational enterprises (MNEs) and international business (IB), especially in the context of CSR and global value chain (GVC) governance. Design/methodology/approach This paper leverages insights from the literature in political science, policy, regulation, governance and IB; from the own earlier work; and from an inventory of CSR standards across a range of sectors and products. Findings This analysis’ more nuanced approach to CSR standard multiplicity helps distinguish the different categories of standards; uncovers the existence of different types of standard multiplicity; and highlights complex trends in their evolution over time, discussing implications for the various firms targeted by, or involved in, these initiatives, and for CSR and GVC governance research. Research limitations/implications This paper opens many avenues for future research on CSR multiplicity and its consequences; on lead firms governing GVCs from an IB perspective; and on institutional and market complexity. Practical implications By providing overviews and classifications, this paper helps clarify CSR standards as “new regulators” and “instruments” for actors in business, society and government. Originality/value This paper contributes by filling gaps in different existing literatures concerning standard multiplicity. It also specifically adds a new perspective to the IB literature, which thus far has not fully incorporated the complexity and dynamics of CSR standard multiplicity in examining GVCs and MNE strategy and policy.

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.

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