We argue that grooming is a commodity that female primates can trade, either for itself or in exchange for other services (sensu biological markets theory) and that the decision to do either will depend on the degree of competition within a social group. We test this using data from four chacma baboon troops, living in two populations that di¡er markedly in the degree of contest competition. As predicted by the predominance of grooming dyads in which females are closely ranked there was, in all four troops, a positive correlation between the time invested by one partner and that by the other. In addition, as predicted, the allocation of time was more closely matched in troops where grooming could not be exchanged for anything else. In troops where resource competition was high, we found in one of two troops a positive relationship between rank distance and the discrepancy in time allocation, with the lower ranking of the partners contributing more grooming.

Why do people resort to plastic surgery to look young? Why are stepchildren at greatest risk of fatal abuse? Why do we prefer gossip to algebra? Why must Dogon wives live alone in a dark hut for five days a month? Why are young children good at learning language but not sharing? Over the past decade, psychologists and behavioral ecologists have been finding answers to such seemingly unrelated questions by applying an evolutionary perspective to the study of human behavior and psychology. Human Evolutionary Psychology is a comprehensive, balanced, and readable introduction to this burgeoning field. It combines a sophisticated understanding of the basics of evolutionary theory with a solid grasp of empirical case studies. Covering not only such traditional subjects as kin selection and mate choice, this text also examines more complex understandings of marriage practices and inheritance rules and the way in which individual action influences the structure of societies and aspects of cultural evolution. It critically assesses the value of evolutionary explanations to humans in both modern Western society and traditional preindustrial societies. And it fairly presents debates within the field, identifying areas of compatibility among sometimes competing approaches. Combining a broad scope with the more in-depth knowledge and sophisticated understanding needed to approach the primary literature, this text is the ideal introduction to the exciting and rapidly expanding study of human evolutionary psychology.

Human height is a highly variable trait, both within and between populations, has a high heritability, and influences the manner in which people behave and are treated in society. Although we know much about human height, this information has rarely been brought together in a comprehensive, systematic fashion. Here, we present a synthetic review of the literature on human height from an explicit evolutionary perspective, addressing its phylogenetic history, development, and environmental and genetic influences on growth and stature. In addition to presenting evidence to suggest the past action of natural selection on human height, we also assess the evidence that natural and sexual selection continues to act on height in contemporary populations. Although there is clear evidence to suggest that selection acts on height, mainly through life-history processes but perhaps also directly, it is also apparent that methodological factors reduce the confidence with which such inferences can be drawn, and there remain surprising gaps in our knowledge. The inability to draw firm conclusions about the adaptiveness of such a highly visible and easily measured trait suggests we should show an appropriate degree of caution when dealing with other human traits in evolutionary perspective.

Current socioecological models suggest that the structure of female-bonded primate groups is predicated on the need for coalitionary support in competitive interactions. Social grooming is thought to be the means by which females ensure support from other individuals, either by the direct exchange of grooming for aid or by using grooming as a means of strengthening social bonds. Since these relationships are valuable, they must be regularly serviced and must be repaired if they become damaged. We question this position and show that empirical evidence to support these theoretical arguments is lacking. We then go on to present a new framework in which the inconsistencies regarding grooming and relationship negotiation are interpreted in the context of individual decision-making processes. In this framework, primate groups represent biological markets in which individuals either trade grooming in a reciprocal manner for the direct benefits that grooming itself offers, or exchange it for tolerance by more powerful animals. A number of testable predictions are derived from this hypotheses. The need for socioecological studies to focus on the dynamics of individual relationships rather than using summary measures is emphasized since only a detailed knowledge of serial interaction will provide the key to understanding the complexities of individual decision-making processes.

The social brain hypothesis is a well-accepted and well-supported evolutionary theory of enlarged brain size in the non-human primates. Nevertheless, it tends to emphasize an anthropocentric view of social life and cognition. This often leads to confusion between ultimate and proximate mechanisms, and an over-reliance on a Cartesian, narratively structured view of the mind and social life, which in turn lead to views of social complexity that are congenial to our views of ourselves, rather than necessarily representative of primate social worlds. In this paper, we argue for greater attention to embodied and distributed theories of cognition, which get us away from current fixations on 'theory of mind' and other high-level anthropocentric constructions, and allow for the generation of testable hypotheses that combine neurobiology, psychology and behaviour in a mutually reinforcing manner.

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Understanding human cognitive evolution, and that of the other primates, means taking sociality very seriously. For humans, this requires the recognition of the sociocultural and historical means by which human minds and selves are constructed, and how this gives rise to the reflexivity and ability to respond to novelty that characterize our species. For other, non-linguistic, primates we can answer some interesting questions by viewing social life as a feedback process, drawing on cybernetics and systems approaches and using social network neo-theory to test these ideas. Specifically, we show how social networks can be formalized as multi-dimensional objects, and use entropy measures to assess how networks respond to perturbation. We use simulations and natural ‘knock-outs’ in a free-ranging baboon troop to demonstrate that changes in interactions after social perturbations lead to a more certain social network, in which the outcomes of interactions are easier for members to predict. This new formalization of social networks provides a framework within which to predict network dynamics and evolution, helps us highlight how human and non-human social networks differ and has implications for theories of cognitive evolution.

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