Children tend to choose an unfamiliar object rather than a familiar one when asked to find the referent of a novel name. This response has been taken as evidence for the operation of certain lexical constraints in children's inferences of word meanings. The present studies test an alternative-pragmatic-explanation of this phenomenon among 3-year-olds. In Study 1 children responded to a request for the referent of a novel label in the same way that they responded to a request for the referent of a novel fact. Study 2 intimated that children assume that labels are common knowledge among members of the same language community. Study 3 demonstrated that shared knowledge between a speaker and listener plays a decisive role in how children interpret a speaker's request. The findings suggest that 3-year-olds' avoidance of lexical overlap is not unique to naming and may derive from children's sensitivity to speakers' communicative intentions.How do children learn the meaning of words so efficiently given the complexity of the contexts in which most new words are encountered? One prevailing answer to this question is that children's inferences about word meanings are guided by a set of internal lexical constraints, biases, or principles that allow children to bypass consideration of most of the logically plausible meanings of a word (Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994;Markman, 1989;Waxman, 1990). For instance, it is argued that children believe that words denote whole objects, that labels refer to categories of objects rather than to individual objects, and that every object has only one name. A second line of thinking points out that young children are knowledgeable about various communication practices and are sensitive to a number of pragmatic cues present in the discourse context that indicate a speaker's communicative intent (L. Bloom, 1998). For instance, young children attend to the direction of a speaker's eye gaze to establish the referent of the speaker's utterance (Baldwin, 1993), they are sensitive to a speaker's affective and behavioral expressions as indicative of whether his or her communicative intent was accomplished (Tomasello,

Children can learn aspects of the meaning of a new word on the basis of only a few incidental exposures and can retain this knowledge for a long period-a process dubbed 'fast mapping". It is often maintained that fast mapping is the result of a dedicated language mechanism, but it is possible that this same capacity might apply in domains other than language learning. Here we present two experiments in which three- and four-year-old children and adults were taught a novel name and a novel fact about an object, and were tested on their retention immediately, after a 1-week delay or after a 1-month delay. Our findings show that fast mapping is not limited to word learning, suggesting that the capacity to learn and retain new words is the result of learning and memory abilities that are not specific to language.

What underlies children's naming of representations, such as when they call a statue of a clothespin “a clothespin”? One possibility is that they focus exclusively on shape, extending the name “clothespin” only to entities that are shaped like typical clothespins. An alternative possibility is that they extend a word that refers to an object to any representation of that object, and that shape is relevant because it is a reliable indicator of representational intent. We explored these possibilities by asking 3- and 4-year-olds to describe pictures that represented objects through intention and analogy. The results suggest that it is children's appreciation of representation that underlies their naming; sameness of shape is neither necessary nor sufficient. We conclude by considering whether this account might apply more generally to artifacts other than pictorial representations.

When children learn a name for a novel artifact, they tend to extend the name to other artifacts that share the same shape--a phenomenon known as the shape bias. The present studies investigated an intentional account of this bias. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown two objects of the same shape, and were given an explanation for why the objects were the same shape even though they were intended to be different kinds. The shape bias disappeared in children provided with this explanation. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were shown triads of objects, and were either given no information about the function of a named target object, told the function that object could fulfill, or told the functions all three objects were intended to fulfill. Only in the third condition did children overcome a shape bias in favor of a function bias when extending the name of the target object. These findings indicate that 3-year-olds' shape bias results from intuitions about what artifacts were intended to be.

a b s t r a c tTwo studies examined the influence of similarity on 3-year-old children's initial liking of their peers. Children were presented with pairs of childlike puppets who were either similar or dissimilar to them on a specified dimension and then were asked to choose one of the puppets to play with as a measure of liking. Children selected the puppet whose food preferences or physical appearance matched their own. Unpacking the physical appearance finding revealed that the stable similarity of hair color may influence liking more strongly than the transient similarity of shirt color. A second study showed that children also prefer to play with a peer who shares their toy preferences, yet importantly, show no bias toward a peer who is similar on an arbitrary dimension. The findings provide insight into the earliest development of peer relations in young children.

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Recent work has shown that young children can learn about preferences by observing the choices and emotional reactions of other people, but there is no unified account of how this learning occurs. We show that a rational model, built on ideas from economics and computer science, explains the behavior of children in several experiments, and offers new predictions as well. First, we demonstrate that when children use statistical information to learn about preferences, their inferences match the predictions of a simple econometric model. Next, we show that this same model can explain children's ability to learn that other people have preferences similar to or different from their own and use that knowledge to reason about the desirability of hidden objects. Finally, we use the model to explain a developmental shift in preference understanding.