SummaryOur brain continuously receives information over multiple timescales that are differently processed across areas. In this study, we investigated the intrinsic timescale of neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) of two rhesus macaques while performing a non-match-to-goal task. The task rule was to reject the previously chosen target and select the alternative one. We defined the intrinsic timescale as the decay constant of the autocorrelation structure computed during a baseline period of the task. We found that neurons with longer intrinsic timescale tended to maintain a stronger spatial response coding during a delay period. This result suggests that longer intrinsic timescales predict the functional role of PMd neurons in a cognitive task. Our estimate of the intrinsic timescale integrates an existing hierarchical model (Murray et al., 2014), by assigning to PMd a lower position than prefrontal cortex in the hierarchical ordering of the brain areas based on neurons' timescales.

Representing others' intentions is central to primate social life. We explored the role of dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) in discriminating between self and others' behavior while two male rhesus monkeys performed a non-match-to-goal task in a monkey-human paradigm. During each trial, two of four potential targets were randomly presented on the right and left parts of a screen, and the monkey or the human was required to choose the one that did not match the previously chosen target. Each agent had to monitor the other's action in order to select the correct target in that agent's own turn. We report neurons that selectively encoded the future choice of the monkey, the human agent, or both. Our findings suggest that PMd activity shows a high degree of self-other differentiation during face-to-face interactions, leading to an independent representation of what others will do instead of entailing self-centered mental rehearsal or mirror-like activities.

Observational learning has been investigated in monkeys mainly using conspecifics or humans as models to observe. Some studies attempted to clarify the social agent’s role and to test whether non-human primates could learn from observation of a non-social agent, usually mentioned as a ‘ghost display’ condition, but they reported conflicting results. To address this question, we trained three rhesus monkeys in an object-in-place task consisting of the presentation of five subsequent problems composed of two objects, one rewarded and one unrewarded, for six times, or runs. Three types of learning conditions were tested. In the individual learning condition, the monkeys performed the first run, learned from it and improved their performance in the following runs. In the social and non-social learning conditions, they observed respectively a human model and a computer performing the first run and learned by the observation of their successes or errors. In all three conditions, the monkeys themselves received the reward after correct choices only. One-trial learning occurred in all three conditions. The monkeys performed over chance in the second run in all conditions, providing evidence of non-social observational learning with differential reward in macaque monkeys using a “ghost display” condition in a cognitive task.

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In neurophysiology, nonhuman primates represent an important model for studying the brain. Typically, monkeys are moved from their home cage to an experimental room daily, where they sit in a primate chair and interact with electronic devices. Refining this procedure would make the researchers’ work easier and improve the animals’ welfare. To address this issue, we used home-cage training to train two macaque monkeys in a non-match-to-goal task, where each trial required a switch from the choice made in the previous trial to obtain a reward. The monkeys were tested in two versions of the task, one in which they acted as the agent in every trial and one in which some trials were completed by a “ghost agent”. We evaluated their involvement in terms of their performance and their interaction with the apparatus. Both monkeys were able to maintain a constant involvement in the task with good, stable performance within sessions in both versions of the task. Our study confirms the feasibility of home-cage training and demonstrates that even with challenging tasks, monkeys can complete a large number of trials at a high performance level, which is a prerequisite for electrophysiological studies of monkey behavior.

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Our representation of magnitudes such as time, distance, and size is not always veridical because it is affected by multiple biases. From a Bayesian perspective, estimation errors are considered to be the result of an optimization mechanism for the behavior in a noisy environment by integrating previous experience with the incoming sensory information. One influence of the distribution of past stimuli on perceptual decisions is represented by the regression toward the mean, a type of contraction bias. Using a spatial discrimination task with 2 stimuli presented sequentially at different distances from the center, we show that this bias is also present in macaques when comparing the magnitude of 2 distances. We found that the contraction of the first stimulus magnitude toward the center of the distribution accounted for some of the changes in performance, even more so than the effect of difficulty related to the ratio between stimulus magnitudes. At the neural level in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the coding of the decision after the presentation of the second stimulus reflected the effect of the contraction bias on the discriminability of the stimuli at the behavioral level.

We can adapt flexibly to environment changes and search for the most appropriate rule to a context. The orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo) has been associated with decision making, rule generation and maintenance, and more generally has been considered important for behavioral flexibility. To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying the flexible behavior, we studied the ability to generate a switching signal in monkey PFo when a strategy is changed. In the strategy task, we used a visual cue to instruct two male rhesus monkeys either to repeat their most recent choice (i.e., stay strategy) or to change it (i.e., shift strategy). To identify the strategy switching-related signal, we compared nonswitch and switch trials, which cued the same or a different strategy from the previous trial, respectively. We found that the switching-related signal emerged during the cue presentation and it was combined with the strategy signal in a subpopulation of cells. Moreover, the error analysis showed that the activity of the switch-related cells reflected whether the monkeys erroneously switched or not the strategy, rather than what was required for that trial. The function of the switching signal could be to prompt the use of different strategies when older strategies are no longer appropriate, conferring the ability to adapt flexibly to environmental changes. In our task, the switching signal might contribute to the implementation of the strategy cued, overcoming potential interference effects from the strategy previously cued. Our results support the idea that ascribes to PFo an important role for behavioral flexibility.